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| author | Stefan Boberg <[email protected]> | 2026-05-04 16:46:03 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | GitHub Enterprise <[email protected]> | 2026-05-04 16:46:03 +0200 |
| commit | 10d2a61fe1c848f44033e8450ff3a5ffa7f4322a (patch) | |
| tree | aa66c6a068b50d2390bdae5f857c7151f15e5a86 /src/zencore/compress.cpp | |
| parent | Tui picker fixes (#1027) (diff) | |
| download | archived-zen-10d2a61fe1c848f44033e8450ff3a5ffa7f4322a.tar.xz archived-zen-10d2a61fe1c848f44033e8450ff3a5ffa7f4322a.zip | |
zenhttp improvements (robustness / correctness) (#968)
A collection of security, correctness, and robustness fixes in `zenhttp` and `zencore` surfaced by security review. Most items are small, independent commits grouped here because they all tighten trust boundaries or fix UB along the same code paths.
## WebSocket protocol hardening (RFC 6455)
- **Enforce the client-side mask bit**. Server-side frame loops now reject unmasked frames with close code 1002 per §5.1. Prevents HTTP intermediary smuggling.
- **Validate control frames and RSV bits**. Fragmented control frames, oversized (>125 B) control payloads, and any non-zero RSV bit now fail the connection before allocation.
- **Lower per-frame payload cap** from 256 MB → 4 MB. Bounds per-connection accumulator memory.
- **Implement message fragmentation**. Continuation frames are coalesced and delivered as a single message; interleaved non-control frames close with 1002; assembled messages are capped at 4 MB (1009 on overflow). Previously partial fragments were delivered to handlers, bypassing payload validation.
- **Parse the 101 handshake response properly** in `HttpWsClient`. Status-line, `Upgrade`, `Connection`, and `Sec-WebSocket-Accept` are now matched exactly rather than via substring searches against the full body.
## Auth / OIDC hardening
- **Constant-time password compare** in `PasswordSecurity::IsAllowed` (closes a remote length/content timing oracle). Adds a shared `ConstantTimeEquals` helper.
- **Harden Basic-auth header parsing**: trim trailing LWS, reject control bytes and DEL in the credential.
- **OIDC discovery pinning**: require HTTPS (loopback exempt), verify `issuer` matches `BaseUrl`, require `token_endpoint` / `userinfo_endpoint` / `jwks_uri` to share origin with `BaseUrl`, reject empty `token_endpoint`.
- **Restrict `POST /auth/oidc/refreshtoken`** to local-machine requests. Previously unauthenticated in default deployments — remote callers could evict or replace cached tokens.
- **Stop logging OIDC provider response bodies** on refresh failure (IdPs echo `refresh_token` back in error bodies).
- **Drop the unused `IdentityToken` field** from `OidcClient` / `OpenIdToken` so nothing in the tree accidentally trusts an unverified JWT.
## Auth state encryption migration
- Add `AesGcm` AEAD primitive (BCrypt / OpenSSL backends, mbedTLS stubbed) and `CryptoRandom::Fill` CSPRNG helper in `zencore/crypto.h`.
- Migrate authstate file from AES-256-CBC with a fixed IV to AES-GCM with a fresh 12-byte random nonce per write and the 4-byte `ZEN1` magic bound as AAD. Legacy-CBC files are transparently read once and rewritten in the new format.
## Filesystem / IO robustness
- `IoBufferExtendedCore::Materialize` now checks `MAP_FAILED` on POSIX (was comparing to `nullptr`, which let the failure sentinel propagate into later reads and `munmap(MAP_FAILED, ...)`).
- `IoBufferBuilder::MakeFromFile / MakeFromTemporaryFile`: close the FD/HANDLE on exception via a dismissable `ScopeGuard`; actually check the `fstat()` return value (previously used an uninitialized `FileSize`).
- `ReadFromFileMaybe`: loop short reads, retry `EINTR`, chunk Windows `ReadFile` at `0xFFFFFFFF` bytes (fixes silent truncation of multi-GiB reads).
- `WipeDirectory`: compare `FindFirstFileW` handle against `INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE` rather than `nullptr`.
- `RemoveFileNative` (Linux/macOS): report non-`ENOENT` stat failures via the `std::error_code` out-param and stop reading `st_mode` after a failed stat.
## Buffer / compression correctness
- Avoid per-copy `IoBufferCore` heap allocations in `CompositeBuffer::CopyTo / ViewOrCopyRange` iterators; add fast path for `BufferHeader::Read` when the 64-byte header fits in the first plain-memory segment.
- `BufferHeader`: add `IsHeaderValid()` gate covering `BlockSizeExponent` range, `BlockCount * BlockSize` overflow, and `TotalRawSize` bounds before any arithmetic uses them. Defends against attacker-controlled headers that can pass the CRC and trigger OOB writes in `DecompressBlock`.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/zencore/compress.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/zencore/compress.cpp | 81 |
1 files changed, 73 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/src/zencore/compress.cpp b/src/zencore/compress.cpp index 6aa0adce0..a0e91f908 100644 --- a/src/zencore/compress.cpp +++ b/src/zencore/compress.cpp @@ -78,12 +78,20 @@ struct BufferHeader BufferHeader Header; if (sizeof(BufferHeader) <= CompressedData.GetSize()) { - // if (CompressedData.GetSegments()[0].AsIoBuffer().IsWholeFile()) - // { - // ZEN_ASSERT(true); - // } - CompositeBuffer::Iterator It; - CompressedData.CopyTo(MakeMutableMemoryView(&Header, &Header + 1), It); + // Fast path: the overwhelmingly common case is that the 64-byte header sits entirely + // within the first segment and that segment is plain memory. Skip the iterator and + // the sub-range IoBuffer wrapper (which would otherwise heap-allocate an IoBufferCore). + const std::span<const SharedBuffer> Segments = CompressedData.GetSegments(); + const SharedBuffer& First = Segments.front(); + if (sizeof(BufferHeader) <= First.GetSize() && !First.IsExtended()) + { + MakeMutableMemoryView(&Header, &Header + 1).CopyFrom(First.GetView().Left(sizeof(BufferHeader))); + } + else + { + CompositeBuffer::Iterator It; + CompressedData.CopyTo(MakeMutableMemoryView(&Header, &Header + 1), It); + } Header.ByteSwap(); } return Header; @@ -837,6 +845,15 @@ BlockDecoder::DecompressToStream( { return false; } + // RawOffset+RawSize-1 below underflows when RawSize is 0, and the + // BlockCount-0 / BlockSize-0 arithmetic is only defined when the header + // has already been validated (see IsHeaderValid). Guard both here as + // defence in depth. + if (RawSize == 0 || Header.BlockCount == 0 || Header.BlockSizeExponent >= 32 || RawOffset > Header.TotalRawSize || + RawSize > Header.TotalRawSize - RawOffset) + { + return false; + } const uint64_t BlockSize = uint64_t(1) << Header.BlockSizeExponent; @@ -1386,6 +1403,50 @@ GetDecoder(CompressionMethod Method) } } +// Sanity-check a header that was just read from an untrusted buffer before +// any of the decode arithmetic (1 << BlockSizeExponent, BlockCount*BlockSize, +// divides by BlockSize, etc.) is performed. Must be called after the magic, +// decoder and CRC checks pass. +static bool +IsHeaderValid(const BufferHeader& Header) +{ + // 1 << BlockSizeExponent is UB for Exponent >= 64 and wildly impractical + // below that. Real producers use <= 24 (16 MiB blocks); cap at 32 for + // headroom while staying well below the UB boundary. + if (Header.BlockSizeExponent >= 32) + { + return false; + } + + // Only the block-based methods use BlockCount / BlockSizeExponent. The + // None method keeps them zero. + if (Header.Method != CompressionMethod::None) + { + // A non-empty buffer needs at least one block. + if (Header.BlockCount == 0) + { + return Header.TotalRawSize == 0; + } + + const uint64_t BlockSize = uint64_t(1) << Header.BlockSizeExponent; + + // BlockCount * BlockSize must not overflow and must fit TotalRawSize + // in the half-open range ((BlockCount - 1) * BlockSize, BlockCount * BlockSize]. + if (Header.BlockCount > (UINT64_MAX / BlockSize)) + { + return false; + } + const uint64_t MaxRawSize = uint64_t(Header.BlockCount) * BlockSize; + const uint64_t MinRawSize = MaxRawSize - BlockSize; + if (Header.TotalRawSize > MaxRawSize || Header.TotalRawSize <= MinRawSize) + { + return false; + } + } + + return true; +} + ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// bool @@ -1426,6 +1487,10 @@ ReadHeader(const CompositeBuffer& CompressedData, BufferHeader& OutHeader, Uniqu { return false; } + if (!IsHeaderValid(OutHeader)) + { + return false; + } uint64_t FullHeaderSize = Decoder->GetHeaderSize(OutHeader); if (FullHeaderSize > CompressedDataSize) { @@ -1520,7 +1585,7 @@ TryReadHeader(DecoderContext& Context, Archive& Ar, FHeader& OutHeader, MemoryVi FHeader* const HeaderCopy = static_cast<FHeader*>(HeaderView.GetData()); HeaderCopy->ByteSwap(); - if (Header.Crc32 == FHeader::CalculateCrc32(HeaderView)) + if (Header.Crc32 == FHeader::CalculateCrc32(HeaderView) && IsHeaderValid(Header)) { Context.HeaderOffset = uint64_t(Offset); Context.HeaderSize = HeaderSize; @@ -1560,7 +1625,7 @@ TryReadHeader(DecoderContext& Context, const CompositeBuffer& Buffer, FHeader& O const MemoryView HeaderView = Buffer.ViewOrCopyRange(0, HeaderSize, Context.Header, [](uint64_t Size) { return UniqueBuffer::Alloc(zen::Max(NextPow2(Size), DefaultHeaderSize)); }); - if (Header.Crc32 == FHeader::CalculateCrc32(HeaderView)) + if (Header.Crc32 == FHeader::CalculateCrc32(HeaderView) && IsHeaderValid(Header)) { Context.HeaderOffset = 0; Context.HeaderSize = HeaderSize; |