From 0f8a6477825fbaad0d37233bdd3011d748f607ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Philip Kaufmann <phil.kaufmann@t-online.de>
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2012 19:38:49 +0100
Subject: don't use memset() in privacy/security relevant code parts

As memset() can be optimized out by a compiler it should not be used in
privacy/security relevant code parts. OpenSSL provides the safe
OPENSSL_cleanse() function in crypto.h, which perfectly does the job of
clean and overwrite data.

For details see: http://www.viva64.com/en/b/0178/

- change memset() to OPENSSL_cleanse() where appropriate
- change a hard-coded number from netbase.cpp into a sizeof()
---
 src/util.cpp | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'src/util.cpp')

diff --git a/src/util.cpp b/src/util.cpp
index 916288645..03014a5da 100644
--- a/src/util.cpp
+++ b/src/util.cpp
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ void RandAddSeedPerfmon()
     if (ret == ERROR_SUCCESS)
     {
         RAND_add(pdata, nSize, nSize/100.0);
-        memset(pdata, 0, nSize);
+        OPENSSL_cleanse(pdata, nSize);
         printf("RandAddSeed() %lu bytes\n", nSize);
     }
 #endif
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