From 8504867b146014c99c6acb180020a1369069c761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Morcos Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2015 16:57:03 -0500 Subject: Save the last unnecessary database read It's possible coins with the same hash exist when you create a duplicate coinbase, so previously we were reading from the database to make sure we had the old coins cached so if we were to spend the new ones, the old ones would also be spent. This pull instead just marks the new coins as not fresh if they are from a coinbase, so if they are spent they will be written all the way down to the database anyway overwriting any duplicates. --- src/main.cpp | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 8fb121c00..3c9c77ef6 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -1310,17 +1310,9 @@ void UpdateCoins(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, CCoinsViewCach undo.nVersion = coins->nVersion; } } - // add outputs - inputs.ModifyNewCoins(tx.GetHash())->FromTx(tx, nHeight); - } - else { - // add outputs for coinbase tx - // In this case call the full ModifyCoins which will do a database - // lookup to be sure the coins do not already exist otherwise we do not - // know whether to mark them fresh or not. We want the duplicate coinbases - // before BIP30 to still be properly overwritten. - inputs.ModifyCoins(tx.GetHash())->FromTx(tx, nHeight); } + // add outputs + inputs.ModifyNewCoins(tx.GetHash(), tx.IsCoinBase())->FromTx(tx, nHeight); } void UpdateCoins(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, CCoinsViewCache &inputs, int nHeight) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 086ee67d839b33bf475177f680fcc848a0625266 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pieter Wuille Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2015 13:20:29 +0100 Subject: Switch to a more efficient rolling Bloom filter For each 'bit' in the filter we really maintain 2 bits, which store either: 0: not set 1-3: set in generation N After (nElements / 2) insertions, we switch to a new generation, and wipe entries which already had the new generation number, effectively switching from the last 1.5 * nElements set to the last 1.0 * nElements set. This is 25% more space efficient than the previous implementation, and can (at peak) store 1.5 times the requested amount of history (though only 1.0 times the requested history is guaranteed). The existing unit tests should be sufficient. --- src/main.cpp | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index ceb5cb66f..422b1e784 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ namespace { * million to make it highly unlikely for users to have issues with this * filter. * - * Memory used: 1.7MB + * Memory used: 1.3 MB */ boost::scoped_ptr recentRejects; uint256 hashRecentRejectsChainTip; -- cgit v1.2.3 From ec73ef37eccfeda76de55c4ff93ea54d4e69e1ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gregory Maxwell Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 05:25:30 +0000 Subject: Replace setInventoryKnown with a rolling bloom filter. Mruset setInventoryKnown was reduced to a remarkably small 1000 entries as a side effect of sendbuffer size reductions in 2012. This removes setInventoryKnown filtering from merkleBlock responses because false positives there are especially unattractive and also because I'm not sure if there aren't race conditions around the relay pool that would cause some transactions there to be suppressed. (Also, ProcessGetData was accessing setInventoryKnown without taking the required lock.) --- src/main.cpp | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 901a34bde..5e39c31bd 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -4138,8 +4138,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const Consensus::Params& consensusParam // however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs typedef std::pair PairType; BOOST_FOREACH(PairType& pair, merkleBlock.vMatchedTxn) - if (!pfrom->setInventoryKnown.count(CInv(MSG_TX, pair.second))) - pfrom->PushMessage("tx", block.vtx[pair.first]); + pfrom->PushMessage("tx", block.vtx[pair.first]); } // else // no response @@ -5511,7 +5510,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) vInvWait.reserve(pto->vInventoryToSend.size()); BOOST_FOREACH(const CInv& inv, pto->vInventoryToSend) { - if (pto->setInventoryKnown.count(inv)) + if (pto->setInventoryKnown.contains(inv.hash)) continue; // trickle out tx inv to protect privacy @@ -5532,9 +5531,9 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) } } - // returns true if wasn't already contained in the set - if (pto->setInventoryKnown.insert(inv).second) + if (!pto->setInventoryKnown.contains(inv.hash)) { + pto->setInventoryKnown.insert(inv.hash); vInv.push_back(inv); if (vInv.size() >= 1000) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6b849350ab074a7ccb80ecbef387f59e1271ded6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Patick Strateman Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 01:52:51 -0800 Subject: Rename setInventoryKnown filterInventoryKnown --- src/main.cpp | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 5e39c31bd..98457d31e 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -5510,7 +5510,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) vInvWait.reserve(pto->vInventoryToSend.size()); BOOST_FOREACH(const CInv& inv, pto->vInventoryToSend) { - if (pto->setInventoryKnown.contains(inv.hash)) + if (pto->filterInventoryKnown.contains(inv.hash)) continue; // trickle out tx inv to protect privacy @@ -5531,9 +5531,9 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) } } - if (!pto->setInventoryKnown.contains(inv.hash)) + if (!pto->filterInventoryKnown.contains(inv.hash)) { - pto->setInventoryKnown.insert(inv.hash); + pto->filterInventoryKnown.insert(inv.hash); vInv.push_back(inv); if (vInv.size() >= 1000) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From d41e44c9accb3df84e0abbc602cc76b72754d382 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gregory Maxwell Date: Sun, 29 Nov 2015 22:10:31 +0000 Subject: Actually only use filterInventoryKnown with MSG_TX inventory messages. Previously this logic could erroneously filter a MSG_BLOCK inventory message. --- src/main.cpp | 16 +++++++--------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 98457d31e..238e2276c 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -5510,7 +5510,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) vInvWait.reserve(pto->vInventoryToSend.size()); BOOST_FOREACH(const CInv& inv, pto->vInventoryToSend) { - if (pto->filterInventoryKnown.contains(inv.hash)) + if (inv.type == MSG_TX && pto->filterInventoryKnown.contains(inv.hash)) continue; // trickle out tx inv to protect privacy @@ -5531,15 +5531,13 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) } } - if (!pto->filterInventoryKnown.contains(inv.hash)) + pto->filterInventoryKnown.insert(inv.hash); + + vInv.push_back(inv); + if (vInv.size() >= 1000) { - pto->filterInventoryKnown.insert(inv.hash); - vInv.push_back(inv); - if (vInv.size() >= 1000) - { - pto->PushMessage("inv", vInv); - vInv.clear(); - } + pto->PushMessage("inv", vInv); + vInv.clear(); } } pto->vInventoryToSend = vInvWait; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 45b8e278fba213fc88ff2be532f15c06accfc857 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luke Dashjr Date: Sat, 22 Feb 2014 02:41:01 +0000 Subject: -bytespersigop option to additionally limit sigops in transactions we relay and mine --- src/main.cpp | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index e9e982043..e860565aa 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ bool fHavePruned = false; bool fPruneMode = false; bool fIsBareMultisigStd = DEFAULT_PERMIT_BAREMULTISIG; bool fRequireStandard = true; +unsigned int nBytesPerSigOp = DEFAULT_BYTES_PER_SIGOP; bool fCheckBlockIndex = false; bool fCheckpointsEnabled = DEFAULT_CHECKPOINTS_ENABLED; size_t nCoinCacheUsage = 5000 * 300; @@ -937,16 +938,8 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, view)) return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs"); - // Check that the transaction doesn't have an excessive number of - // sigops, making it impossible to mine. Since the coinbase transaction - // itself can contain sigops MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS is less than - // MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS; we still consider this an invalid rather than - // merely non-standard transaction. unsigned int nSigOps = GetLegacySigOpCount(tx); nSigOps += GetP2SHSigOpCount(tx, view); - if (nSigOps > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", false, - strprintf("%d > %d", nSigOps, MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS)); CAmount nValueOut = tx.GetValueOut(); CAmount nFees = nValueIn-nValueOut; @@ -967,6 +960,15 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa CTxMemPoolEntry entry(tx, nFees, GetTime(), dPriority, chainActive.Height(), pool.HasNoInputsOf(tx), inChainInputValue, fSpendsCoinbase, nSigOps); unsigned int nSize = entry.GetTxSize(); + // Check that the transaction doesn't have an excessive number of + // sigops, making it impossible to mine. Since the coinbase transaction + // itself can contain sigops MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS is less than + // MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS; we still consider this an invalid rather than + // merely non-standard transaction. + if ((nSigOps > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS) || (nBytesPerSigOp && nSigOps > nSize / nBytesPerSigOp)) + return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", false, + strprintf("%d", nSigOps)); + // Don't accept it if it can't get into a block CAmount txMinFee = GetMinRelayFee(tx, pool, nSize, true); if (fLimitFree && nFees < txMinFee) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9ef2a25603c9ec4e44c4f45c6a5d4e4386ec86d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suhas Daftuar Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 16:42:36 -0500 Subject: Update replace-by-fee logic to use fee deltas --- src/main.cpp | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index cb3f8f39f..23df8ca68 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -1061,13 +1061,17 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C uint64_t nConflictingCount = 0; CTxMemPool::setEntries allConflicting; + CAmount nModifiedFees = nFees; + double nPriorityDummy = 0; + pool.ApplyDeltas(hash, nPriorityDummy, nModifiedFees); + // If we don't hold the lock allConflicting might be incomplete; the // subsequent RemoveStaged() and addUnchecked() calls don't guarantee // mempool consistency for us. LOCK(pool.cs); if (setConflicts.size()) { - CFeeRate newFeeRate(nFees, nSize); + CFeeRate newFeeRate(nModifiedFees, nSize); set setConflictsParents; const int maxDescendantsToVisit = 100; CTxMemPool::setEntries setIterConflicting; @@ -1110,7 +1114,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C // ignored when deciding whether or not to replace, we do // require the replacement to pay more overall fees too, // mitigating most cases. - CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetFee(), mi->GetTxSize()); + CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize()); if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate) { return state.DoS(0, @@ -1138,7 +1142,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C pool.CalculateDescendants(it, allConflicting); } BOOST_FOREACH(CTxMemPool::txiter it, allConflicting) { - nConflictingFees += it->GetFee(); + nConflictingFees += it->GetModifiedFee(); nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize(); } } else { @@ -1171,16 +1175,16 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C // The replacement must pay greater fees than the transactions it // replaces - if we did the bandwidth used by those conflicting // transactions would not be paid for. - if (nFees < nConflictingFees) + if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees) { return state.DoS(0, error("AcceptToMemoryPool: rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s", - hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees)), + hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees)), REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee"); } // Finally in addition to paying more fees than the conflicts the // new transaction must pay for its own bandwidth. - CAmount nDeltaFees = nFees - nConflictingFees; + CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees; if (nDeltaFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)) { return state.DoS(0, @@ -1218,7 +1222,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C LogPrint("mempool", "replacing tx %s with %s for %s BTC additional fees, %d delta bytes\n", it->GetTx().GetHash().ToString(), hash.ToString(), - FormatMoney(nFees - nConflictingFees), + FormatMoney(nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees), (int)nSize - (int)nConflictingSize); } pool.RemoveStaged(allConflicting); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 27fae3484cdb21b0d24face833b966fce5926be5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suhas Daftuar Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2015 09:37:18 -0500 Subject: Use fee deltas for determining mempool acceptance --- src/main.cpp | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 23df8ca68..12642f319 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -968,6 +968,11 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C CAmount nValueOut = tx.GetValueOut(); CAmount nFees = nValueIn-nValueOut; + // nModifiedFees includes any fee deltas from PrioritiseTransaction + CAmount nModifiedFees = nFees; + double nPriorityDummy = 0; + pool.ApplyDeltas(hash, nPriorityDummy, nModifiedFees); + CAmount inChainInputValue; double dPriority = view.GetPriority(tx, chainActive.Height(), inChainInputValue); @@ -987,14 +992,17 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C // Don't accept it if it can't get into a block CAmount txMinFee = GetMinRelayFee(tx, pool, nSize, true); + + // txMinFee takes into account priority/fee deltas, so compare using + // nFees rather than nModifiedFees if (fLimitFree && nFees < txMinFee) return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nFees, txMinFee)); CAmount mempoolRejectFee = pool.GetMinFee(GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(nSize); - if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && nFees < mempoolRejectFee) { + if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && nModifiedFees < mempoolRejectFee) { return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nFees, mempoolRejectFee)); - } else if (GetBoolArg("-relaypriority", DEFAULT_RELAYPRIORITY) && nFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize) && !AllowFree(entry.GetPriority(chainActive.Height() + 1))) { + } else if (GetBoolArg("-relaypriority", DEFAULT_RELAYPRIORITY) && nModifiedFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize) && !AllowFree(entry.GetPriority(chainActive.Height() + 1))) { // Require that free transactions have sufficient priority to be mined in the next block. return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient priority"); } @@ -1002,7 +1010,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C // Continuously rate-limit free (really, very-low-fee) transactions // This mitigates 'penny-flooding' -- sending thousands of free transactions just to // be annoying or make others' transactions take longer to confirm. - if (fLimitFree && nFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)) + if (fLimitFree && nModifiedFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize)) { static CCriticalSection csFreeLimiter; static double dFreeCount; @@ -1061,10 +1069,6 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C uint64_t nConflictingCount = 0; CTxMemPool::setEntries allConflicting; - CAmount nModifiedFees = nFees; - double nPriorityDummy = 0; - pool.ApplyDeltas(hash, nPriorityDummy, nModifiedFees); - // If we don't hold the lock allConflicting might be incomplete; the // subsequent RemoveStaged() and addUnchecked() calls don't guarantee // mempool consistency for us. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 901b01d674031f9aca717deeb372bafa160a24af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suhas Daftuar Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2015 11:04:15 -0500 Subject: Remove GetMinRelayFee One test in AcceptToMemoryPool was to compare a transaction's fee agains the value returned by GetMinRelayFee. This value was zero for all small transactions. For larger transactions (between DEFAULT_BLOCK_PRIORITY_SIZE and MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIZE), this function was preventing low fee transactions from ever being accepted. With this function removed, we will now allow transactions in that range with fees (including modifications via PrioritiseTransaction) below the minRelayTxFee, provided that they have sufficient priority. --- src/main.cpp | 35 ----------------------------------- 1 file changed, 35 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 12642f319..9363015a5 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -800,32 +800,6 @@ void LimitMempoolSize(CTxMemPool& pool, size_t limit, unsigned long age) { pcoinsTip->Uncache(removed); } -CAmount GetMinRelayFee(const CTransaction& tx, const CTxMemPool& pool, unsigned int nBytes, bool fAllowFree) -{ - uint256 hash = tx.GetHash(); - double dPriorityDelta = 0; - CAmount nFeeDelta = 0; - pool.ApplyDeltas(hash, dPriorityDelta, nFeeDelta); - if (dPriorityDelta > 0 || nFeeDelta > 0) - return 0; - - CAmount nMinFee = ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nBytes); - - if (fAllowFree) - { - // There is a free transaction area in blocks created by most miners, - // * If we are relaying we allow transactions up to DEFAULT_BLOCK_PRIORITY_SIZE - 1000 - // to be considered to fall into this category. We don't want to encourage sending - // multiple transactions instead of one big transaction to avoid fees. - if (nBytes < (DEFAULT_BLOCK_PRIORITY_SIZE - 1000)) - nMinFee = 0; - } - - if (!MoneyRange(nMinFee)) - nMinFee = MAX_MONEY; - return nMinFee; -} - /** Convert CValidationState to a human-readable message for logging */ std::string FormatStateMessage(const CValidationState &state) { @@ -990,15 +964,6 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C CTxMemPoolEntry entry(tx, nFees, GetTime(), dPriority, chainActive.Height(), pool.HasNoInputsOf(tx), inChainInputValue, fSpendsCoinbase, nSigOps); unsigned int nSize = entry.GetTxSize(); - // Don't accept it if it can't get into a block - CAmount txMinFee = GetMinRelayFee(tx, pool, nSize, true); - - // txMinFee takes into account priority/fee deltas, so compare using - // nFees rather than nModifiedFees - if (fLimitFree && nFees < txMinFee) - return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient fee", false, - strprintf("%d < %d", nFees, txMinFee)); - CAmount mempoolRejectFee = pool.GetMinFee(GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(nSize); if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && nModifiedFees < mempoolRejectFee) { return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nFees, mempoolRejectFee)); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6aadc7557823b7673b8f661b3d41cf867e2936a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gregory Maxwell Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2015 20:13:10 +0000 Subject: Disconnect on mempool requests from peers when over the upload limit. Mempool requests use a fair amount of bandwidth when the mempool is large, disconnecting peers using them follows the same logic as disconnecting peers fetching historical blocks. --- src/main.cpp | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index bfa71a729..22e71c0c4 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -4981,6 +4981,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, else if (strCommand == "mempool") { + if (CNode::OutboundTargetReached(false) && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) + { + LogPrint("net", "mempool request with bandwidth limit reached, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return true; + } LOCK2(cs_main, pfrom->cs_filter); std::vector vtxid; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7d0bf0bb4652fad052d5bf3ca3bf883754b46ead Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonas Schnelli Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 15:33:03 +0200 Subject: include the chaintip *blockIndex in the SyncTransaction signal - allows reducing of calls to main.cpp for getting the chaintip during transaction syncing - potentially allows reducing of cs_main locks --- src/main.cpp | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index bfa71a729..be14dec1c 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C } } - SyncWithWallets(tx, NULL); + SyncWithWallets(tx, NULL, NULL); return true; } @@ -2391,7 +2391,7 @@ bool static DisconnectTip(CValidationState& state, const Consensus::Params& cons // Let wallets know transactions went from 1-confirmed to // 0-confirmed or conflicted: BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction &tx, block.vtx) { - SyncWithWallets(tx, NULL); + SyncWithWallets(tx, pindexDelete->pprev, NULL); } return true; } @@ -2450,11 +2450,11 @@ bool static ConnectTip(CValidationState& state, const CChainParams& chainparams, // Tell wallet about transactions that went from mempool // to conflicted: BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction &tx, txConflicted) { - SyncWithWallets(tx, NULL); + SyncWithWallets(tx, pindexNew, NULL); } // ... and about transactions that got confirmed: BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction &tx, pblock->vtx) { - SyncWithWallets(tx, pblock); + SyncWithWallets(tx, pindexNew, pblock); } int64_t nTime6 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimePostConnect += nTime6 - nTime5; nTimeTotal += nTime6 - nTime1; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 96918a2f0990a8207d7631b8de73af8ae5d24aeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Matt Corallo Date: Sat, 5 Dec 2015 17:45:44 +0800 Subject: Don't do mempool lookups for "mempool" command without a filter --- src/main.cpp | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 22e71c0c4..a0e996ae7 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -4994,12 +4994,13 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, vector vInv; BOOST_FOREACH(uint256& hash, vtxid) { CInv inv(MSG_TX, hash); - CTransaction tx; - bool fInMemPool = mempool.lookup(hash, tx); - if (!fInMemPool) continue; // another thread removed since queryHashes, maybe... - if ((pfrom->pfilter && pfrom->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(tx)) || - (!pfrom->pfilter)) - vInv.push_back(inv); + if (pfrom->pfilter) { + CTransaction tx; + bool fInMemPool = mempool.lookup(hash, tx); + if (!fInMemPool) continue; // another thread removed since queryHashes, maybe... + if (!pfrom->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(tx)) continue; + } + vInv.push_back(inv); if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { pfrom->PushMessage("inv", vInv); vInv.clear(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9fc6ed6003da42f035309240c715ce0fd063ec03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Wladimir J. van der Laan" Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 14:47:58 +0100 Subject: net: Fix sent reject messages for blocks and transactions Ever since we #5913 have been sending invalid reject messages for transactions and blocks. --- src/main.cpp | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index a0e996ae7..84f737258 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -4824,7 +4824,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, pfrom->id, FormatStateMessage(state)); if (state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) // Never send AcceptToMemoryPool's internal codes over P2P - pfrom->PushMessage("reject", strCommand, state.GetRejectCode(), + pfrom->PushMessage("reject", strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), inv.hash); if (nDoS > 0) Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS); @@ -4954,7 +4954,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int nDoS; if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { assert (state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL); // Blocks are never rejected with internal reject codes - pfrom->PushMessage("reject", strCommand, state.GetRejectCode(), + pfrom->PushMessage("reject", strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), inv.hash); if (nDoS > 0) { LOCK(cs_main); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9bbe71b641e2fc985daf127988a14a67c99da50a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Wladimir J. van der Laan" Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 15:31:32 +0100 Subject: net: Add and document network messages in protocol.h - Avoids string typos (by making the compiler check) - Makes it easier to grep for handling/generation of a certain message type - Refer directly to documentation by following the symbol in IDE - Move list of valid message types to protocol.cpp: protocol.cpp is a more appropriate place for this, and having the array there makes it easier to keep things consistent. --- src/main.cpp | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 84f737258..d2e736d42 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -4171,14 +4171,14 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const Consensus::Params& consensusParam if (!ReadBlockFromDisk(block, (*mi).second, consensusParams)) assert(!"cannot load block from disk"); if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK) - pfrom->PushMessage("block", block); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::BLOCK, block); else // MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK) { LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); if (pfrom->pfilter) { CMerkleBlock merkleBlock(block, *pfrom->pfilter); - pfrom->PushMessage("merkleblock", merkleBlock); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::MERKLEBLOCK, merkleBlock); // CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any transactions in the block the client did not see // This avoids hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip // Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didn't send here - @@ -4187,7 +4187,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const Consensus::Params& consensusParam // however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs typedef std::pair PairType; BOOST_FOREACH(PairType& pair, merkleBlock.vMatchedTxn) - pfrom->PushMessage("tx", block.vtx[pair.first]); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::TX, block.vtx[pair.first]); } // else // no response @@ -4201,7 +4201,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const Consensus::Params& consensusParam // wait for other stuff first. vector vInv; vInv.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash())); - pfrom->PushMessage("inv", vInv); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::INV, vInv); pfrom->hashContinue.SetNull(); } } @@ -4224,7 +4224,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const Consensus::Params& consensusParam CDataStream ss(SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION); ss.reserve(1000); ss << tx; - pfrom->PushMessage("tx", ss); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::TX, ss); pushed = true; } } @@ -4251,7 +4251,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const Consensus::Params& consensusParam // do that because they want to know about (and store and rebroadcast and // risk analyze) the dependencies of transactions relevant to them, without // having to download the entire memory pool. - pfrom->PushMessage("notfound", vNotFound); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::NOTFOUND, vNotFound); } } @@ -4268,9 +4268,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, if (!(nLocalServices & NODE_BLOOM) && - (strCommand == "filterload" || - strCommand == "filteradd" || - strCommand == "filterclear")) + (strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERLOAD || + strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERADD || + strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERCLEAR)) { if (pfrom->nVersion >= NO_BLOOM_VERSION) { Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100); @@ -4282,12 +4282,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - if (strCommand == "version") + if (strCommand == NetMsgType::VERSION) { // Each connection can only send one version message if (pfrom->nVersion != 0) { - pfrom->PushMessage("reject", strCommand, REJECT_DUPLICATE, string("Duplicate version message")); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_DUPLICATE, string("Duplicate version message")); Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 1); return false; } @@ -4301,7 +4301,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, { // disconnect from peers older than this proto version LogPrintf("peer=%d using obsolete version %i; disconnecting\n", pfrom->id, pfrom->nVersion); - pfrom->PushMessage("reject", strCommand, REJECT_OBSOLETE, + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("Version must be %d or greater", MIN_PEER_PROTO_VERSION)); pfrom->fDisconnect = true; return false; @@ -4346,7 +4346,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, UpdatePreferredDownload(pfrom, State(pfrom->GetId())); // Change version - pfrom->PushMessage("verack"); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::VERACK); pfrom->ssSend.SetVersion(min(pfrom->nVersion, PROTOCOL_VERSION)); if (!pfrom->fInbound) @@ -4369,7 +4369,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // Get recent addresses if (pfrom->fOneShot || pfrom->nVersion >= CADDR_TIME_VERSION || addrman.size() < 1000) { - pfrom->PushMessage("getaddr"); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::GETADDR); pfrom->fGetAddr = true; } addrman.Good(pfrom->addr); @@ -4413,7 +4413,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (strCommand == "verack") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::VERACK) { pfrom->SetRecvVersion(min(pfrom->nVersion, PROTOCOL_VERSION)); @@ -4428,12 +4428,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because even // non-NODE NETWORK peers can announce blocks (such as pruning // nodes) - pfrom->PushMessage("sendheaders"); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::SENDHEADERS); } } - else if (strCommand == "addr") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::ADDR) { vector vAddr; vRecv >> vAddr; @@ -4499,14 +4499,14 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, pfrom->fDisconnect = true; } - else if (strCommand == "sendheaders") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::SENDHEADERS) { LOCK(cs_main); State(pfrom->GetId())->fPreferHeaders = true; } - else if (strCommand == "inv") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::INV) { vector vInv; vRecv >> vInv; @@ -4547,7 +4547,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // time the block arrives, the header chain leading up to it is already validated. Not // doing this will result in the received block being rejected as an orphan in case it is // not a direct successor. - pfrom->PushMessage("getheaders", chainActive.GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), inv.hash); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexBestHeader), inv.hash); CNodeState *nodestate = State(pfrom->GetId()); if (CanDirectFetch(chainparams.GetConsensus()) && nodestate->nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) { @@ -4577,11 +4577,11 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } if (!vToFetch.empty()) - pfrom->PushMessage("getdata", vToFetch); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vToFetch); } - else if (strCommand == "getdata") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETDATA) { vector vInv; vRecv >> vInv; @@ -4602,7 +4602,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (strCommand == "getblocks") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETBLOCKS) { CBlockLocator locator; uint256 hashStop; @@ -4646,7 +4646,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (strCommand == "getheaders") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::GETHEADERS) { CBlockLocator locator; uint256 hashStop; @@ -4691,11 +4691,11 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // headers message). In both cases it's safe to update // pindexBestHeaderSent to be our tip. nodestate->pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex ? pindex : chainActive.Tip(); - pfrom->PushMessage("headers", vHeaders); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::HEADERS, vHeaders); } - else if (strCommand == "tx") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::TX) { // Stop processing the transaction early if // We are in blocks only mode and peer is either not whitelisted or whitelistalwaysrelay is off @@ -4824,7 +4824,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, pfrom->id, FormatStateMessage(state)); if (state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) // Never send AcceptToMemoryPool's internal codes over P2P - pfrom->PushMessage("reject", strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), inv.hash); if (nDoS > 0) Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), nDoS); @@ -4833,7 +4833,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (strCommand == "headers" && !fImporting && !fReindex) // Ignore headers received while importing + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::HEADERS && !fImporting && !fReindex) // Ignore headers received while importing { std::vector headers; @@ -4881,7 +4881,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // TODO: optimize: if pindexLast is an ancestor of chainActive.Tip or pindexBestHeader, continue // from there instead. LogPrint("net", "more getheaders (%d) to end to peer=%d (startheight:%d)\n", pindexLast->nHeight, pfrom->id, pfrom->nStartingHeight); - pfrom->PushMessage("getheaders", chainActive.GetLocator(pindexLast), uint256()); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexLast), uint256()); } bool fCanDirectFetch = CanDirectFetch(chainparams.GetConsensus()); @@ -4926,7 +4926,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, pindexLast->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindexLast->nHeight); } if (vGetData.size() > 0) { - pfrom->PushMessage("getdata", vGetData); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vGetData); } } } @@ -4934,7 +4934,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, CheckBlockIndex(chainparams.GetConsensus()); } - else if (strCommand == "block" && !fImporting && !fReindex) // Ignore blocks received while importing + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::BLOCK && !fImporting && !fReindex) // Ignore blocks received while importing { CBlock block; vRecv >> block; @@ -4954,7 +4954,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int nDoS; if (state.IsInvalid(nDoS)) { assert (state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL); // Blocks are never rejected with internal reject codes - pfrom->PushMessage("reject", strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), inv.hash); if (nDoS > 0) { LOCK(cs_main); @@ -4970,7 +4970,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages. // Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore // the getaddr message mitigates the attack. - else if ((strCommand == "getaddr") && (pfrom->fInbound)) + else if ((strCommand == NetMsgType::GETADDR) && (pfrom->fInbound)) { pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear(); vector vAddr = addrman.GetAddr(); @@ -4979,7 +4979,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (strCommand == "mempool") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::MEMPOOL) { if (CNode::OutboundTargetReached(false) && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) { @@ -5002,16 +5002,16 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } vInv.push_back(inv); if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { - pfrom->PushMessage("inv", vInv); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::INV, vInv); vInv.clear(); } } if (vInv.size() > 0) - pfrom->PushMessage("inv", vInv); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::INV, vInv); } - else if (strCommand == "ping") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::PING) { if (pfrom->nVersion > BIP0031_VERSION) { @@ -5028,12 +5028,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, // it, if the remote node sends a ping once per second and this node takes 5 // seconds to respond to each, the 5th ping the remote sends would appear to // return very quickly. - pfrom->PushMessage("pong", nonce); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::PONG, nonce); } } - else if (strCommand == "pong") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::PONG) { int64_t pingUsecEnd = nTimeReceived; uint64_t nonce = 0; @@ -5090,7 +5090,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (fAlerts && strCommand == "alert") + else if (fAlerts && strCommand == NetMsgType::ALERT) { CAlert alert; vRecv >> alert; @@ -5121,7 +5121,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (strCommand == "filterload") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERLOAD) { CBloomFilter filter; vRecv >> filter; @@ -5140,7 +5140,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (strCommand == "filteradd") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERADD) { vector vData; vRecv >> vData; @@ -5160,7 +5160,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (strCommand == "filterclear") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERCLEAR) { LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); delete pfrom->pfilter; @@ -5169,7 +5169,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, } - else if (strCommand == "reject") + else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::REJECT) { if (fDebug) { try { @@ -5179,7 +5179,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, ostringstream ss; ss << strMsg << " code " << itostr(ccode) << ": " << strReason; - if (strMsg == "block" || strMsg == "tx") + if (strMsg == NetMsgType::BLOCK || strMsg == NetMsgType::TX) { uint256 hash; vRecv >> hash; @@ -5287,7 +5287,7 @@ bool ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom) } catch (const std::ios_base::failure& e) { - pfrom->PushMessage("reject", strCommand, REJECT_MALFORMED, string("error parsing message")); + pfrom->PushMessage(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_MALFORMED, string("error parsing message")); if (strstr(e.what(), "end of data")) { // Allow exceptions from under-length message on vRecv @@ -5355,11 +5355,11 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) pto->nPingUsecStart = GetTimeMicros(); if (pto->nVersion > BIP0031_VERSION) { pto->nPingNonceSent = nonce; - pto->PushMessage("ping", nonce); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::PING, nonce); } else { // Peer is too old to support ping command with nonce, pong will never arrive. pto->nPingNonceSent = 0; - pto->PushMessage("ping"); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::PING); } } @@ -5401,14 +5401,14 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) // receiver rejects addr messages larger than 1000 if (vAddr.size() >= 1000) { - pto->PushMessage("addr", vAddr); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::ADDR, vAddr); vAddr.clear(); } } } pto->vAddrToSend.clear(); if (!vAddr.empty()) - pto->PushMessage("addr", vAddr); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::ADDR, vAddr); } CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId()); @@ -5428,7 +5428,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) } BOOST_FOREACH(const CBlockReject& reject, state.rejects) - pto->PushMessage("reject", (string)"block", reject.chRejectCode, reject.strRejectReason, reject.hashBlock); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::REJECT, (string)NetMsgType::BLOCK, reject.chRejectCode, reject.strRejectReason, reject.hashBlock); state.rejects.clear(); // Start block sync @@ -5451,7 +5451,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) if (pindexStart->pprev) pindexStart = pindexStart->pprev; LogPrint("net", "initial getheaders (%d) to peer=%d (startheight:%d)\n", pindexStart->nHeight, pto->id, pto->nStartingHeight); - pto->PushMessage("getheaders", chainActive.GetLocator(pindexStart), uint256()); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::GETHEADERS, chainActive.GetLocator(pindexStart), uint256()); } } @@ -5551,7 +5551,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) LogPrint("net", "%s: sending header %s to peer=%d\n", __func__, vHeaders.front().GetHash().ToString(), pto->id); } - pto->PushMessage("headers", vHeaders); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::HEADERS, vHeaders); state.pindexBestHeaderSent = pBestIndex; } pto->vBlockHashesToAnnounce.clear(); @@ -5594,14 +5594,14 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) vInv.push_back(inv); if (vInv.size() >= 1000) { - pto->PushMessage("inv", vInv); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::INV, vInv); vInv.clear(); } } pto->vInventoryToSend = vInvWait; } if (!vInv.empty()) - pto->PushMessage("inv", vInv); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::INV, vInv); // Detect whether we're stalling int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros(); @@ -5670,7 +5670,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) vGetData.push_back(inv); if (vGetData.size() >= 1000) { - pto->PushMessage("getdata", vGetData); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vGetData); vGetData.clear(); } } else { @@ -5680,7 +5680,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) pto->mapAskFor.erase(pto->mapAskFor.begin()); } if (!vGetData.empty()) - pto->PushMessage("getdata", vGetData); + pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::GETDATA, vGetData); } return true; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5400ef6bcb9d243b2b21697775aa6491115420f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pieter Wuille Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2015 11:20:00 -0700 Subject: Replace trickle nodes with per-node/message Poisson delays We used to have a trickle node, a node which was chosen in each iteration of the send loop that was privileged and allowed to send out queued up non-time critical messages. Since the removal of the fixed sleeps in the network code, this resulted in fast and attackable treatment of such broadcasts. This pull request changes the 3 remaining trickle use cases by random delays: * Local address broadcast (while also removing the the wiping of the seen filter) * Address relay * Inv relay (for transactions; blocks are always relayed immediately) The code is based on older commits by Patrick Strateman. --- src/main.cpp | 34 ++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index d2e736d42..41fc0b809 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -5326,7 +5326,7 @@ bool ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom) } -bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) +bool SendMessages(CNode* pto) { const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus(); { @@ -5368,28 +5368,17 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) return true; // Address refresh broadcast - static int64_t nLastRebroadcast; - if (!IsInitialBlockDownload() && (GetTime() - nLastRebroadcast > 24 * 60 * 60)) - { - LOCK(cs_vNodes); - BOOST_FOREACH(CNode* pnode, vNodes) - { - // Periodically clear addrKnown to allow refresh broadcasts - if (nLastRebroadcast) - pnode->addrKnown.reset(); - - // Rebroadcast our address - AdvertizeLocal(pnode); - } - if (!vNodes.empty()) - nLastRebroadcast = GetTime(); + int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros(); + if (!IsInitialBlockDownload() && pto->nNextLocalAddrSend < nNow) { + AdvertizeLocal(pto); + pto->nNextLocalAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); } // // Message: addr // - if (fSendTrickle) - { + if (pto->nNextAddrSend < nNow) { + pto->nNextAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); vector vAddr; vAddr.reserve(pto->vAddrToSend.size()); BOOST_FOREACH(const CAddress& addr, pto->vAddrToSend) @@ -5563,8 +5552,13 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) vector vInv; vector vInvWait; { + bool fSendTrickle = pto->fWhitelisted; + if (pto->nNextInvSend < nNow) { + fSendTrickle = true; + pto->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); + } LOCK(pto->cs_inventory); - vInv.reserve(pto->vInventoryToSend.size()); + vInv.reserve(std::min(1000, pto->vInventoryToSend.size())); vInvWait.reserve(pto->vInventoryToSend.size()); BOOST_FOREACH(const CInv& inv, pto->vInventoryToSend) { @@ -5604,7 +5598,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle) pto->PushMessage(NetMsgType::INV, vInv); // Detect whether we're stalling - int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros(); + nNow = GetTimeMicros(); if (!pto->fDisconnect && state.nStallingSince && state.nStallingSince < nNow - 1000000 * BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT) { // Stalling only triggers when the block download window cannot move. During normal steady state, // the download window should be much larger than the to-be-downloaded set of blocks, so disconnection -- cgit v1.2.3 From fa24439ff3d8ab5b9efaf66ef4dae6713b88cb35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MarcoFalke Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 17:58:29 +0100 Subject: Bump copyright headers to 2015 --- src/main.cpp | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index cb3f8f39f..dc891fecf 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ // Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto -// Copyright (c) 2009-2014 The Bitcoin Core developers +// Copyright (c) 2009-2015 The Bitcoin Core developers // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. -- cgit v1.2.3 From 64360f13044125fbb3cdcbe2e5e8f2bfb82a8b27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Wladimir J. van der Laan" Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 13:23:45 +0100 Subject: Make max tip age an option instead of chainparam After discussion in #7164 I think this is better. Max tip age was introduced in #5987 to make it possible to run testnet-in-a-box. But associating this behavior with the testnet chain is wrong conceptually, as it is not needed in normal usage. Should aim to make testnet test the software as-is. Replace it with a (debug) option `-maxtipage`, which can be specified only in the specific case. --- src/main.cpp | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index d2e736d42..72cfb4ca3 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ bool fCheckpointsEnabled = DEFAULT_CHECKPOINTS_ENABLED; size_t nCoinCacheUsage = 5000 * 300; uint64_t nPruneTarget = 0; bool fAlerts = DEFAULT_ALERTS; +/* If the tip is older than this (in seconds), the node is considered to be in initial block download. + */ +int64_t nMaxTipAge = DEFAULT_MAX_TIP_AGE; /** Fees smaller than this (in satoshi) are considered zero fee (for relaying, mining and transaction creation) */ CFeeRate minRelayTxFee = CFeeRate(DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE); @@ -1402,7 +1405,7 @@ bool IsInitialBlockDownload() if (lockIBDState) return false; bool state = (chainActive.Height() < pindexBestHeader->nHeight - 24 * 6 || - pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() < GetTime() - chainParams.MaxTipAge()); + pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() < GetTime() - nMaxTipAge); if (!state) lockIBDState = true; return state; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 39a525c21fd1b34df63ab30868423b97b708ee49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ptschip Date: Sat, 5 Dec 2015 09:02:02 -0800 Subject: Do not download transactions during inital sync --- src/main.cpp | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 41fc0b809..875248446 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -4563,7 +4563,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, { if (fBlocksOnly) LogPrint("net", "transaction (%s) inv sent in violation of protocol peer=%d\n", inv.hash.ToString(), pfrom->id); - else if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex) + else if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !IsInitialBlockDownload()) pfrom->AskFor(inv); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5246180f168c9b761b6158b0725f5718239ba66c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suhas Daftuar Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 15:40:50 -0500 Subject: Mark blocks with too many sigops as failed --- src/main.cpp | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 41fc0b809..001da9c6c 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -3005,7 +3005,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo } if (nSigOps > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS) return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): out-of-bounds SigOpCount"), - REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", true); + REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops"); if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot) block.fChecked = true; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a5a0831458d8290c1e7591cf32a529669b613d86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: 21E14 <21xe14@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2015 22:42:27 -0500 Subject: Double semicolon cleanup. --- src/main.cpp | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index a43eef07b..dbfb0c812 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ struct COrphanTx { CTransaction tx; NodeId fromPeer; }; -map mapOrphanTransactions GUARDED_BY(cs_main);; -map > mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev GUARDED_BY(cs_main);; +map mapOrphanTransactions GUARDED_BY(cs_main); +map > mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev GUARDED_BY(cs_main); void EraseOrphansFor(NodeId peer) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main); /** -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7ef8f3c072a8750c72a3a1cdc727b5c1d173bac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pieter Wuille Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 16:50:31 +0100 Subject: Report non-mandatory script failures correctly --- src/main.cpp | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index a43eef07b..0766b1458 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -1653,9 +1653,9 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi // arguments; if so, don't trigger DoS protection to // avoid splitting the network between upgraded and // non-upgraded nodes. - CScriptCheck check(*coins, tx, i, + CScriptCheck check2(*coins, tx, i, flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheStore); - if (check()) + if (check2()) return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError()))); } // Failures of other flags indicate a transaction that is -- cgit v1.2.3 From fd836153d5c99073b290edd74c3507a00231885d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Todd Date: Sun, 3 Jan 2016 20:39:05 -0800 Subject: Improve CheckInputs() comment about sig verification --- src/main.cpp | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index a43eef07b..60e96bbf1 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -1631,9 +1631,12 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, const CCoinsVi // Only if ALL inputs pass do we perform expensive ECDSA signature checks. // Helps prevent CPU exhaustion attacks. - // Skip ECDSA signature verification when connecting blocks - // before the last block chain checkpoint. This is safe because block merkle hashes are - // still computed and checked, and any change will be caught at the next checkpoint. + // Skip ECDSA signature verification when connecting blocks before the + // last block chain checkpoint. Assuming the checkpoints are valid this + // is safe because block merkle hashes are still computed and checked, + // and any change will be caught at the next checkpoint. Of course, if + // the checkpoint is for a chain that's invalid due to false scriptSigs + // this optimisation would allow an invalid chain to be accepted. if (fScriptChecks) { for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++) { const COutPoint &prevout = tx.vin[i].prevout; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2dfeaa1ad03e7768fb28bfde7f929ac57dfff120 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ptschip Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2015 18:18:16 -0700 Subject: limitfreerelay edge case bugfix: If a new transaction will cause limitfreerelay to be exceeded it should not be accepted into the memory pool and the byte counter should be updated only after the fact. --- src/main.cpp | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 41fc0b809..08a95aff2 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C nLastTime = nNow; // -limitfreerelay unit is thousand-bytes-per-minute // At default rate it would take over a month to fill 1GB - if (dFreeCount >= GetArg("-limitfreerelay", DEFAULT_LIMITFREERELAY) * 10 * 1000) + if (dFreeCount + nSize >= GetArg("-limitfreerelay", DEFAULT_LIMITFREERELAY) * 10 * 1000) return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "rate limited free transaction"); LogPrint("mempool", "Rate limit dFreeCount: %g => %g\n", dFreeCount, dFreeCount+nSize); dFreeCount += nSize; -- cgit v1.2.3 From b768108d9c0b83330572711aef1e569543130d5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Wladimir J. van der Laan" Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2016 11:11:01 +0100 Subject: Add option `-permitrbf` to set transaction replacement policy Add a configuration option `-permitrbf` to set transaction replacement policy for the mempool. Enabling it will enable (opt-in) RBF, disabling it will refuse all conflicting transactions. --- src/main.cpp | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 9870beecc..8522b0d1b 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ bool fAlerts = DEFAULT_ALERTS; /* If the tip is older than this (in seconds), the node is considered to be in initial block download. */ int64_t nMaxTipAge = DEFAULT_MAX_TIP_AGE; +bool fPermitReplacement = DEFAULT_PERMIT_REPLACEMENT; /** Fees smaller than this (in satoshi) are considered zero fee (for relaying, mining and transaction creation) */ CFeeRate minRelayTxFee = CFeeRate(DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE); @@ -868,12 +869,15 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C // unconfirmed ancestors anyway; doing otherwise is hopelessly // insecure. bool fReplacementOptOut = true; - BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn &txin, ptxConflicting->vin) + if (fPermitReplacement) { - if (txin.nSequence < std::numeric_limits::max()-1) + BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn &txin, ptxConflicting->vin) { - fReplacementOptOut = false; - break; + if (txin.nSequence < std::numeric_limits::max()-1) + { + fReplacementOptOut = false; + break; + } } } if (fReplacementOptOut) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 77b55a00ed4a3a3a22ec3e299539a1812a0bc605 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luke Dashjr Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 05:09:29 +0000 Subject: Rename permitrbf to replacebyfee "permit" is currently used to configure transaction filtering, whereas replacement is more to do with the memory pool state than the transaction itself. --- src/main.cpp | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index c8ea62758..392300d57 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ bool fAlerts = DEFAULT_ALERTS; /* If the tip is older than this (in seconds), the node is considered to be in initial block download. */ int64_t nMaxTipAge = DEFAULT_MAX_TIP_AGE; -bool fPermitReplacement = DEFAULT_PERMIT_REPLACEMENT; +bool fEnableReplacement = DEFAULT_ENABLE_REPLACEMENT; /** Fees smaller than this (in satoshi) are considered zero fee (for relaying, mining and transaction creation) */ CFeeRate minRelayTxFee = CFeeRate(DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE); @@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C // unconfirmed ancestors anyway; doing otherwise is hopelessly // insecure. bool fReplacementOptOut = true; - if (fPermitReplacement) + if (fEnableReplacement) { BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn &txin, ptxConflicting->vin) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 325c725fb6205e38142914acb9ed1733d8482d46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gregory Maxwell Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 23:00:23 +0000 Subject: Add whitelistforcerelay to control forced relaying. Also renames whitelistalwaysrelay. Nodes relay all transactions from whitelisted peers, this gets in the way of some useful reasons for whitelisting peers-- for example, bypassing bandwidth limitations. The purpose of this forced relaying is for specialized gateway applications where a node is being used as a P2P connection filter and multiplexer, but where you don't want it getting in the way of (re-)broadcast. This change makes it configurable with whitelistforcerelay. --- src/main.cpp | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index c8ea62758..235280784 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -4495,8 +4495,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, bool fBlocksOnly = GetBoolArg("-blocksonly", DEFAULT_BLOCKSONLY); - // Allow whitelisted peers to send data other than blocks in blocks only mode if whitelistalwaysrelay is true - if (pfrom->fWhitelisted && GetBoolArg("-whitelistalwaysrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTALWAYSRELAY)) + // Allow whitelisted peers to send data other than blocks in blocks only mode if whitelistrelay is true + if (pfrom->fWhitelisted && GetBoolArg("-whitelistrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTRELAY)) fBlocksOnly = false; LOCK(cs_main); @@ -4675,8 +4675,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, else if (strCommand == NetMsgType::TX) { // Stop processing the transaction early if - // We are in blocks only mode and peer is either not whitelisted or whitelistalwaysrelay is off - if (GetBoolArg("-blocksonly", DEFAULT_BLOCKSONLY) && (!pfrom->fWhitelisted || !GetBoolArg("-whitelistalwaysrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTALWAYSRELAY))) + // We are in blocks only mode and peer is either not whitelisted or whitelistrelay is off + if (GetBoolArg("-blocksonly", DEFAULT_BLOCKSONLY) && (!pfrom->fWhitelisted || !GetBoolArg("-whitelistrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTRELAY))) { LogPrint("net", "transaction sent in violation of protocol peer=%d\n", pfrom->id); return true; @@ -4776,7 +4776,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, assert(recentRejects); recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash()); - if (pfrom->fWhitelisted && GetBoolArg("-whitelistalwaysrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTALWAYSRELAY)) { + if (pfrom->fWhitelisted && GetBoolArg("-whitelistforcerelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTFORCERELAY)) { // Always relay transactions received from whitelisted peers, even // if they were already in the mempool or rejected from it due // to policy, allowing the node to function as a gateway for -- cgit v1.2.3 From 93fc58c7426b5f3c68f2657626698846fb512ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Jorge=20Tim=C3=B3n?= Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2015 03:13:47 +0100 Subject: Consensus: Remove calls to error() and FormatStateMessage() from some consensus code in main --- src/main.cpp | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 06374cc1b..8e35dc78d 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -814,12 +814,13 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fOverrideMempoolLimit, bool fRejectAbsurdFee, std::vector& vHashTxnToUncache) { + const uint256 hash = tx.GetHash(); AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (pfMissingInputs) *pfMissingInputs = false; if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state)) - return false; + return error("%s: CheckTransaction: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); // Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction if (tx.IsCoinBase()) @@ -837,7 +838,6 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-final"); // is it already in the memory pool? - uint256 hash = tx.GetHash(); if (pool.exists(hash)) return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_ALREADY_KNOWN, "txn-already-in-mempool"); @@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C // Check against previous transactions // This is done last to help prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks. if (!CheckInputs(tx, state, view, true, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS, true)) - return false; + return error("%s: CheckInputs: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); // Check again against just the consensus-critical mandatory script // verification flags, in case of bugs in the standard flags that cause @@ -1964,7 +1964,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin // Check it again in case a previous version let a bad block in if (!CheckBlock(block, state, !fJustCheck, !fJustCheck)) - return false; + return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state)); // verify that the view's current state corresponds to the previous block uint256 hashPrevBlock = pindex->pprev == NULL ? uint256() : pindex->pprev->GetBlockHash(); @@ -2909,13 +2909,11 @@ bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state, bool f { // Check proof of work matches claimed amount if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, Params().GetConsensus())) - return state.DoS(50, error("CheckBlockHeader(): proof of work failed"), - REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash"); + return state.DoS(50, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed"); // Check timestamp if (block.GetBlockTime() > GetAdjustedTime() + 2 * 60 * 60) - return state.Invalid(error("CheckBlockHeader(): block timestamp too far in the future"), - REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new"); + return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future"); return true; } @@ -2937,15 +2935,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo bool mutated; uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated); if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2) - return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): hashMerkleRoot mismatch"), - REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true); + return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txnmrklroot", true, "hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block, // while still invalidating it. if (mutated) - return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): duplicate transaction"), - REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true); + return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-duplicate", true, "duplicate transaction"); } // All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any @@ -2954,24 +2950,20 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo // Size limits if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE || ::GetSerializeSize(block, SER_NETWORK, PROTOCOL_VERSION) > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) - return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): size limits failed"), - REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length"); + return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-length", false, "size limits failed"); // First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0].IsCoinBase()) - return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): first tx is not coinbase"), - REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing"); + return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-missing", false, "first tx is not coinbase"); for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++) if (block.vtx[i].IsCoinBase()) - return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): more than one coinbase"), - REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple"); + return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-multiple", false, "more than one coinbase"); // Check transactions BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction& tx, block.vtx) if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state)) - return error("CheckBlock(): CheckTransaction of %s failed with %s", - tx.GetHash().ToString(), - FormatStateMessage(state)); + return state.Invalid(false, state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason(), + strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx.GetHash().ToString(), state.GetDebugMessage())); unsigned int nSigOps = 0; BOOST_FOREACH(const CTransaction& tx, block.vtx) @@ -2979,8 +2971,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, bool fCheckPOW, bo nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(tx); } if (nSigOps > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS) - return state.DoS(100, error("CheckBlock(): out-of-bounds SigOpCount"), - REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops"); + return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-blk-sigops", false, "out-of-bounds SigOpCount"); if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot) block.fChecked = true; @@ -3007,28 +2998,17 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& sta const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus(); // Check proof of work if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams)) - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: incorrect proof of work", __func__), - REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits"); + return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-diffbits", false, "incorrect proof of work"); // Check timestamp against prev if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast()) - return state.Invalid(error("%s: block's timestamp is too early", __func__), - REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old"); - - // Reject block.nVersion=1 blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded: - if (block.nVersion < 2 && IsSuperMajority(2, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams)) - return state.Invalid(error("%s: rejected nVersion=1 block", __func__), - REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version"); + return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early"); - // Reject block.nVersion=2 blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded: - if (block.nVersion < 3 && IsSuperMajority(3, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams)) - return state.Invalid(error("%s: rejected nVersion=2 block", __func__), - REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version"); - - // Reject block.nVersion=3 blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded: - if (block.nVersion < 4 && IsSuperMajority(4, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams)) - return state.Invalid(error("%s : rejected nVersion=3 block", __func__), - REJECT_OBSOLETE, "bad-version"); + // Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded: + for (int32_t version = 2; version < 5; ++version) // check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades + if (block.nVersion < version && IsSuperMajority(version, pindexPrev, consensusParams.nMajorityRejectBlockOutdated, consensusParams)) + return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(v%d)", version - 1), + strprintf("rejected nVersion=%d block", version - 1)); return true; } @@ -3045,7 +3025,7 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIn ? pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast() : block.GetBlockTime(); if (!IsFinalTx(tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) { - return state.DoS(10, error("%s: contains a non-final transaction", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal"); + return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction"); } } @@ -3056,7 +3036,7 @@ bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIn CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight; if (block.vtx[0].vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() || !std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0].vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) { - return state.DoS(100, error("%s: block height mismatch in coinbase", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height"); + return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-cb-height", false, "block height mismatch in coinbase"); } } @@ -3083,7 +3063,7 @@ static bool AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state } if (!CheckBlockHeader(block, state)) - return false; + return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); // Get prev block index CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = NULL; @@ -3099,7 +3079,7 @@ static bool AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state return error("%s: CheckIndexAgainstCheckpoint(): %s", __func__, state.GetRejectReason().c_str()); if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, pindexPrev)) - return false; + return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); } if (pindex == NULL) pindex = AddToBlockIndex(block); @@ -3146,7 +3126,7 @@ static bool AcceptBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, const CCha pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; setDirtyBlockIndex.insert(pindex); } - return false; + return error("%s: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state)); } int nHeight = pindex->nHeight; @@ -3197,7 +3177,7 @@ bool ProcessNewBlock(CValidationState& state, const CChainParams& chainparams, c bool fRequested = MarkBlockAsReceived(pblock->GetHash()); fRequested |= fForceProcessing; if (!checked) { - return error("%s: CheckBlock FAILED", __func__); + return error("%s: CheckBlock FAILED %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state)); } // Store to disk @@ -3231,11 +3211,11 @@ bool TestBlockValidity(CValidationState& state, const CChainParams& chainparams, // NOTE: CheckBlockHeader is called by CheckBlock if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, pindexPrev)) - return false; + return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state)); if (!CheckBlock(block, state, fCheckPOW, fCheckMerkleRoot)) - return false; + return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state)); if (!ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, pindexPrev)) - return false; + return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlock: %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state)); if (!ConnectBlock(block, state, &indexDummy, viewNew, true)) return false; assert(state.IsValid()); @@ -3565,7 +3545,8 @@ bool CVerifyDB::VerifyDB(const CChainParams& chainparams, CCoinsView *coinsview, return error("VerifyDB(): *** ReadBlockFromDisk failed at %d, hash=%s", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); // check level 1: verify block validity if (nCheckLevel >= 1 && !CheckBlock(block, state)) - return error("VerifyDB(): *** found bad block at %d, hash=%s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); + return error("%s: *** found bad block at %d, hash=%s (%s)\n", __func__, + pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state)); // check level 2: verify undo validity if (nCheckLevel >= 2 && pindex) { CBlockUndo undo; -- cgit v1.2.3 From fa331db68bcc68e4c93fb45aaa30f911b0ecfe1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MarcoFalke Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2015 20:32:36 +0100 Subject: mempool: Replace maxFeeRate of 10000*minRelayTxFee with maxTxFee --- src/main.cpp | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 8beff9769..76ad969c6 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -75,13 +75,11 @@ bool fCheckpointsEnabled = DEFAULT_CHECKPOINTS_ENABLED; size_t nCoinCacheUsage = 5000 * 300; uint64_t nPruneTarget = 0; bool fAlerts = DEFAULT_ALERTS; -/* If the tip is older than this (in seconds), the node is considered to be in initial block download. - */ int64_t nMaxTipAge = DEFAULT_MAX_TIP_AGE; bool fPermitReplacement = DEFAULT_PERMIT_REPLACEMENT; -/** Fees smaller than this (in satoshi) are considered zero fee (for relaying, mining and transaction creation) */ CFeeRate minRelayTxFee = CFeeRate(DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE); +CAmount maxTxFee = DEFAULT_TRANSACTION_MAXFEE; CTxMemPool mempool(::minRelayTxFee); @@ -1004,10 +1002,10 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C dFreeCount += nSize; } - if (fRejectAbsurdFee && nFees > ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize) * 10000) + if (fRejectAbsurdFee && nFees > maxTxFee) return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_HIGHFEE, "absurdly-high-fee", - strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize) * 10000)); + strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, maxTxFee)); // Calculate in-mempool ancestors, up to a limit. CTxMemPool::setEntries setAncestors; -- cgit v1.2.3 From dbb89dc793b0fc19a0d0ac5c4ef08cc2760b06bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suhas Daftuar Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:45:33 -0500 Subject: Eliminate unnecessary call to CheckBlock ProcessNewBlock would return failure early if CheckBlock failed, before calling AcceptBlock. AcceptBlock also calls CheckBlock, and upon failure would update mapBlockIndex to indicate that a block was failed. By returning early in ProcessNewBlock, we were not marking blocks that fail a check in CheckBlock as permanently failed, and thus would continue to re-request and reprocess them. --- src/main.cpp | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index bc7b0daaf..01d1024b0 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -3171,16 +3171,10 @@ static bool IsSuperMajority(int minVersion, const CBlockIndex* pstart, unsigned bool ProcessNewBlock(CValidationState& state, const CChainParams& chainparams, const CNode* pfrom, const CBlock* pblock, bool fForceProcessing, CDiskBlockPos* dbp) { - // Preliminary checks - bool checked = CheckBlock(*pblock, state); - { LOCK(cs_main); bool fRequested = MarkBlockAsReceived(pblock->GetHash()); fRequested |= fForceProcessing; - if (!checked) { - return error("%s: CheckBlock FAILED %s", __func__, FormatStateMessage(state)); - } // Store to disk CBlockIndex *pindex = NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From fa79db2641182b47b4077345d8261d28c4a87bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MarcoFalke Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 16:48:06 +0100 Subject: Move maxTxFee out of mempool Also, remove default values in CMerkleTx::AcceptToMemoryPool() --- src/main.cpp | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 4d16b9f9a..9ed9d0e0b 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ std::string FormatStateMessage(const CValidationState &state) } bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransaction &tx, bool fLimitFree, - bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fOverrideMempoolLimit, bool fRejectAbsurdFee, + bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fOverrideMempoolLimit, CAmount nAbsurdFee, std::vector& vHashTxnToUncache) { const uint256 hash = tx.GetHash(); @@ -1002,10 +1002,10 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C dFreeCount += nSize; } - if (fRejectAbsurdFee && nFees > maxTxFee) + if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee) return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_HIGHFEE, "absurdly-high-fee", - strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, maxTxFee)); + strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee)); // Calculate in-mempool ancestors, up to a limit. CTxMemPool::setEntries setAncestors; @@ -1220,10 +1220,10 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C } bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransaction &tx, bool fLimitFree, - bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fOverrideMempoolLimit, bool fRejectAbsurdFee) + bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fOverrideMempoolLimit, const CAmount nAbsurdFee) { std::vector vHashTxToUncache; - bool res = AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(pool, state, tx, fLimitFree, pfMissingInputs, fOverrideMempoolLimit, fRejectAbsurdFee, vHashTxToUncache); + bool res = AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(pool, state, tx, fLimitFree, pfMissingInputs, fOverrideMempoolLimit, nAbsurdFee, vHashTxToUncache); if (!res) { BOOST_FOREACH(const uint256& hashTx, vHashTxToUncache) pcoinsTip->Uncache(hashTx); -- cgit v1.2.3 From fad6244879be8b9916e85cff4ecdb4377dd62ee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: MarcoFalke Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 13:14:23 +0100 Subject: ATMP: make nAbsurdFee const --- src/main.cpp | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 9ed9d0e0b..e4e4bc62b 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -812,8 +812,8 @@ std::string FormatStateMessage(const CValidationState &state) state.GetRejectCode()); } -bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransaction &tx, bool fLimitFree, - bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fOverrideMempoolLimit, CAmount nAbsurdFee, +bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState& state, const CTransaction& tx, bool fLimitFree, + bool* pfMissingInputs, bool fOverrideMempoolLimit, const CAmount nAbsurdFee, std::vector& vHashTxnToUncache) { const uint256 hash = tx.GetHash(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From f3757a039196c804f252a4efba294e8f2b4d301d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Jorge=20Tim=C3=B3n?= Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2015 03:15:42 +0100 Subject: Consensus: Decouple pow.cpp from util.h --- src/main.cpp | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 4d16b9f9a..8bed2962f 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -2291,8 +2291,9 @@ void static UpdateTip(CBlockIndex *pindexNew) { nTimeBestReceived = GetTime(); mempool.AddTransactionsUpdated(1); - LogPrintf("%s: new best=%s height=%d log2_work=%.8g tx=%lu date=%s progress=%f cache=%.1fMiB(%utx)\n", __func__, - chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash().ToString(), chainActive.Height(), log(chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork.getdouble())/log(2.0), (unsigned long)chainActive.Tip()->nChainTx, + LogPrintf("%s: new best=%s height=%d bits=%d log2_work=%.8g tx=%lu date=%s progress=%f cache=%.1fMiB(%utx)\n", __func__, + chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockHash().ToString(), chainActive.Height(), chainActive.Tip()->nBits, + log(chainActive.Tip()->nChainWork.getdouble())/log(2.0), (unsigned long)chainActive.Tip()->nChainTx, DateTimeStrFormat("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", chainActive.Tip()->GetBlockTime()), Checkpoints::GuessVerificationProgress(chainParams.Checkpoints(), chainActive.Tip()), pcoinsTip->DynamicMemoryUsage() * (1.0 / (1<<20)), pcoinsTip->GetCacheSize()); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 301bc7bc7e83f4c268c1722558b07dbb5b55fa92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suhas Daftuar Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2016 15:32:29 -0500 Subject: Update nQueuedValidatedHeaders after peer disconnection --- src/main.cpp | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 984523408..94071d381 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -332,8 +332,10 @@ void FinalizeNode(NodeId nodeid) { AddressCurrentlyConnected(state->address); } - BOOST_FOREACH(const QueuedBlock& entry, state->vBlocksInFlight) + BOOST_FOREACH(const QueuedBlock& entry, state->vBlocksInFlight) { + nQueuedValidatedHeaders -= entry.fValidatedHeaders; mapBlocksInFlight.erase(entry.hash); + } EraseOrphansFor(nodeid); nPreferredDownload -= state->fPreferredDownload; -- cgit v1.2.3 From e4eebb604e19f67b0c7a483b1ded1229d75ecdd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pieter Wuille Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 15:47:06 +0100 Subject: Update the wallet best block marker when pruning --- src/main.cpp | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 20539c1ba..3ad2979b6 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -2262,7 +2262,7 @@ bool static FlushStateToDisk(CValidationState &state, FlushStateMode mode) { return AbortNode(state, "Failed to write to coin database"); nLastFlush = nNow; } - if ((mode == FLUSH_STATE_ALWAYS || mode == FLUSH_STATE_PERIODIC) && nNow > nLastSetChain + (int64_t)DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL * 1000000) { + if (fDoFullFlush || ((mode == FLUSH_STATE_ALWAYS || mode == FLUSH_STATE_PERIODIC) && nNow > nLastSetChain + (int64_t)DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL * 1000000)) { // Update best block in wallet (so we can detect restored wallets). GetMainSignals().SetBestChain(chainActive.GetLocator()); nLastSetChain = nNow; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c6c2f0fd782ccf607027414012f45c8f48561a30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Morcos Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2015 15:44:16 -0500 Subject: Implement SequenceLocks functions SequenceLocks functions are used to evaluate sequence lock times or heights per BIP 68. The majority of this code is copied from maaku in #6312 Further credit: btcdrak, sipa, NicolasDorier --- src/main.cpp | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 148 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index a0e996ae7..d9bf3bd75 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -667,9 +667,10 @@ bool IsFinalTx(const CTransaction &tx, int nBlockHeight, int64_t nBlockTime) return true; if ((int64_t)tx.nLockTime < ((int64_t)tx.nLockTime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD ? (int64_t)nBlockHeight : nBlockTime)) return true; - BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin) - if (!txin.IsFinal()) + BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin) { + if (!(txin.nSequence == CTxIn::SEQUENCE_FINAL)) return false; + } return true; } @@ -705,6 +706,128 @@ bool CheckFinalTx(const CTransaction &tx, int flags) return IsFinalTx(tx, nBlockHeight, nBlockTime); } +/** + * Calculates the block height and previous block's median time past at + * which the transaction will be considered final in the context of BIP 68. + * Also removes from the vector of input heights any entries which did not + * correspond to sequence locked inputs as they do not affect the calculation. + */ +static std::pair CalculateSequenceLocks(const CTransaction &tx, int flags, std::vector* prevHeights, const CBlockIndex& block) +{ + assert(prevHeights->size() == tx.vin.size()); + + // Will be set to the equivalent height- and time-based nLockTime + // values that would be necessary to satisfy all relative lock- + // time constraints given our view of block chain history. + // The semantics of nLockTime are the last invalid height/time, so + // use -1 to have the effect of any height or time being valid. + int nMinHeight = -1; + int64_t nMinTime = -1; + + // tx.nVersion is signed integer so requires cast to unsigned otherwise + // we would be doing a signed comparison and half the range of nVersion + // wouldn't support BIP 68. + bool fEnforceBIP68 = static_cast(tx.nVersion) >= 2 + && flags & LOCKTIME_VERIFY_SEQUENCE; + + // Do not enforce sequence numbers as a relative lock time + // unless we have been instructed to + if (!fEnforceBIP68) { + return std::make_pair(nMinHeight, nMinTime); + } + + for (size_t txinIndex = 0; txinIndex < tx.vin.size(); txinIndex++) { + const CTxIn& txin = tx.vin[txinIndex]; + + // Sequence numbers with the most significant bit set are not + // treated as relative lock-times, nor are they given any + // consensus-enforced meaning at this point. + if (txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_DISABLE_FLAG) { + // The height of this input is not relevant for sequence locks + (*prevHeights)[txinIndex] = 0; + continue; + } + + int nCoinHeight = (*prevHeights)[txinIndex]; + + if (txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_TYPE_FLAG) { + int64_t nCoinTime = block.GetAncestor(std::max(nCoinHeight-1, 0))->GetMedianTimePast(); + // NOTE: Subtract 1 to maintain nLockTime semantics + // BIP 68 relative lock times have the semantics of calculating + // the first block or time at which the transaction would be + // valid. When calculating the effective block time or height + // for the entire transaction, we switch to using the + // semantics of nLockTime which is the last invalid block + // time or height. Thus we subtract 1 from the calculated + // time or height. + + // Time-based relative lock-times are measured from the + // smallest allowed timestamp of the block containing the + // txout being spent, which is the median time past of the + // block prior. + nMinTime = std::max(nMinTime, nCoinTime + (int64_t)((txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_MASK) << CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_GRANULARITY) - 1); + } else { + nMinHeight = std::max(nMinHeight, nCoinHeight + (int)(txin.nSequence & CTxIn::SEQUENCE_LOCKTIME_MASK) - 1); + } + } + + return std::make_pair(nMinHeight, nMinTime); +} + +static bool EvaluateSequenceLocks(const CBlockIndex& block, std::pair lockPair) +{ + assert(block.pprev); + int64_t nBlockTime = block.pprev->GetMedianTimePast(); + if (lockPair.first >= block.nHeight || lockPair.second >= nBlockTime) + return false; + + return true; +} + +bool SequenceLocks(const CTransaction &tx, int flags, std::vector* prevHeights, const CBlockIndex& block) +{ + return EvaluateSequenceLocks(block, CalculateSequenceLocks(tx, flags, prevHeights, block)); +} + +bool CheckSequenceLocks(const CTransaction &tx, int flags) +{ + AssertLockHeld(cs_main); + AssertLockHeld(mempool.cs); + + CBlockIndex* tip = chainActive.Tip(); + CBlockIndex index; + index.pprev = tip; + // CheckSequenceLocks() uses chainActive.Height()+1 to evaluate + // height based locks because when SequenceLocks() is called within + // CBlock::AcceptBlock(), the height of the block *being* + // evaluated is what is used. Thus if we want to know if a + // transaction can be part of the *next* block, we need to call + // SequenceLocks() with one more than chainActive.Height(). + index.nHeight = tip->nHeight + 1; + + // pcoinsTip contains the UTXO set for chainActive.Tip() + CCoinsViewMemPool viewMemPool(pcoinsTip, mempool); + std::vector prevheights; + prevheights.resize(tx.vin.size()); + for (size_t txinIndex = 0; txinIndex < tx.vin.size(); txinIndex++) { + const CTxIn& txin = tx.vin[txinIndex]; + CCoins coins; + if (!viewMemPool.GetCoins(txin.prevout.hash, coins)) { + return error("%s: Missing input", __func__); + } + if (coins.nHeight == MEMPOOL_HEIGHT) { + // Assume all mempool transaction confirm in the next block + prevheights[txinIndex] = tip->nHeight + 1; + } else { + prevheights[txinIndex] = coins.nHeight; + } + } + + std::pair lockPair = CalculateSequenceLocks(tx, flags, &prevheights, index); + return EvaluateSequenceLocks(index, lockPair); +} + + unsigned int GetLegacySigOpCount(const CTransaction& tx) { unsigned int nSigOps = 0; @@ -949,6 +1072,14 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const C // we have all inputs cached now, so switch back to dummy, so we don't need to keep lock on mempool view.SetBackend(dummy); + + // Only accept BIP68 sequence locked transactions that can be mined in the next + // block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't + // be mined yet. + // Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a + // CoinsViewCache instead of create its own + if (!CheckSequenceLocks(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS)) + return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "non-BIP68-final"); } // Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs @@ -2075,6 +2206,8 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin CCheckQueueControl control(fScriptChecks && nScriptCheckThreads ? &scriptcheckqueue : NULL); + std::vector prevheights; + int nLockTimeFlags = 0; CAmount nFees = 0; int nInputs = 0; unsigned int nSigOps = 0; @@ -2098,6 +2231,19 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): inputs missing/spent"), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent"); + // Check that transaction is BIP68 final + // BIP68 lock checks (as opposed to nLockTime checks) must + // be in ConnectBlock because they require the UTXO set + prevheights.resize(tx.vin.size()); + for (size_t j = 0; j < tx.vin.size(); j++) { + prevheights[j] = view.AccessCoins(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)->nHeight; + } + + if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) { + return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__), + REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal"); + } + if (fStrictPayToScriptHash) { // Add in sigops done by pay-to-script-hash inputs; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1fb91b3496f2f07bbace1f9f8e716f7f62d889e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luke Dashjr Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 06:35:25 +0000 Subject: Common argument defaults for NODE_BLOOM stuff and -wallet --- src/main.cpp | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index cb3f8f39f..12c349a65 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -4276,7 +4276,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, if (pfrom->nVersion >= NO_BLOOM_VERSION) { Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100); return false; - } else if (GetBoolArg("-enforcenodebloom", false)) { + } else if (GetBoolArg("-enforcenodebloom", DEFAULT_ENFORCENODEBLOOM)) { pfrom->fDisconnect = true; return false; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b043c4b746c8199ce948aa5e8b186e0d1a61ad68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Morcos Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 15:34:04 -0500 Subject: fix sdaftuar's nits again it boggles the mind why these nits can't be delivered on a more timely basis --- src/main.cpp | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index d9bf3bd75..7d75e2ea6 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -799,10 +799,10 @@ bool CheckSequenceLocks(const CTransaction &tx, int flags) index.pprev = tip; // CheckSequenceLocks() uses chainActive.Height()+1 to evaluate // height based locks because when SequenceLocks() is called within - // CBlock::AcceptBlock(), the height of the block *being* - // evaluated is what is used. Thus if we want to know if a - // transaction can be part of the *next* block, we need to call - // SequenceLocks() with one more than chainActive.Height(). + // ConnectBlock(), the height of the block *being* + // evaluated is what is used. + // Thus if we want to know if a transaction can be part of the + // *next* block, we need to use one more than chainActive.Height() index.nHeight = tip->nHeight + 1; // pcoinsTip contains the UTXO set for chainActive.Tip() @@ -2240,7 +2240,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin } if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) { - return state.DoS(100, error("ConnectBlock(): contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__), + return state.DoS(100, error("%s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction", __func__), REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal"); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 37767fd46f673a06864df6e14d3030622b1cb2c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jloughry Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2016 11:35:32 -0700 Subject: fix spelling of advertise in src and doc --- src/main.cpp | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'src/main.cpp') diff --git a/src/main.cpp b/src/main.cpp index 6398fdad9..23429ea2c 100644 --- a/src/main.cpp +++ b/src/main.cpp @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ void MarkBlockAsInFlight(NodeId nodeid, const uint256& hash, const Consensus::Pa mapBlocksInFlight[hash] = std::make_pair(nodeid, it); } -/** Check whether the last unknown block a peer advertized is not yet known. */ +/** Check whether the last unknown block a peer advertised is not yet known. */ void ProcessBlockAvailability(NodeId nodeid) { CNodeState *state = State(nodeid); assert(state != NULL); @@ -4456,11 +4456,11 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, CAddress addr = GetLocalAddress(&pfrom->addr); if (addr.IsRoutable()) { - LogPrintf("ProcessMessages: advertizing address %s\n", addr.ToString()); + LogPrintf("ProcessMessages: advertising address %s\n", addr.ToString()); pfrom->PushAddress(addr); } else if (IsPeerAddrLocalGood(pfrom)) { addr.SetIP(pfrom->addrLocal); - LogPrintf("ProcessMessages: advertizing address %s\n", addr.ToString()); + LogPrintf("ProcessMessages: advertising address %s\n", addr.ToString()); pfrom->PushAddress(addr); } } @@ -5469,7 +5469,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto) // Address refresh broadcast int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros(); if (!IsInitialBlockDownload() && pto->nNextLocalAddrSend < nNow) { - AdvertizeLocal(pto); + AdvertiseLocal(pto); pto->nNextLocalAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); } -- cgit v1.2.3