| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Conflicts:
src/main.cpp
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- I introduced the wrong format macro with my former patch (#2018), this
needs to be signed not unsigned (thanks Luke-Jr)
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- fixes 2 warnings I observed while compiling on Windows with MinGW
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Conflicts:
src/main.cpp
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Conflicts:
src/bitcoinrpc.cpp
src/crypter.h
src/main.cpp
src/qt/bitcoin.cpp
src/qt/qtipcserver.cpp
src/util.cpp
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Conflicts:
src/init.cpp
src/main.cpp
src/serialize.h
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Conflicts:
src/bitcoinrpc.cpp
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CreateNewBlock was reading pindexBest at the start before taking the lock
so it was possible to have the the block content not match the prevheader.
(Partial of faff50d129b6d4b9e6397ac989218e83a26ae692)
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Matt pointed out some time ago that there existed a minor DOS
attack where a node in its initial block download could be wedged
by an overwrite attack in a fork created between checkpoints before
a time where BIP30 was enforced. Now that the BIP30 timestamp
is irreversibly past the check can be more aggressive and apply to
all blocks except the two historic violations.
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Conflicts:
bitcoin-qt.pro
doc/README
doc/README_windows.txt
share/setup.nsi
src/main.cpp
src/main.h
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Conflicts:
bitcoin-qt.pro
doc/README
doc/README_windows.txt
share/setup.nsi
src/serialize.h
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Conflicts:
contrib/Bitcoin.app/Contents/Info.plist
doc/README
doc/README_windows.txt
share/setup.nsi
src/serialize.h
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Hard-code a special nId=max int alert, to be broadcast if the
alert key is ever compromised. It applies to all versions, never
expires, cancels all previous alerts, and has a fixed message:
URGENT: Alert key compromised, upgrade required
Variations are not allowed (ignored), so an attacker with
the private key cannot broadcast empty-message nId=max alerts.
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This fixes two alert system vulnerabilities found by
Sergio Lerner; you could send peers unlimited numbers
of invalid alert message to try to either fill up their
debug.log with messages and/or keep their CPU busy
checking signatures.
Fixed by disconnecting/banning peers if they send 10 or more
bad (invalid/expired/cancelled) alerts.
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This fixes two alert system vulnerabilities found by
Sergio Lerner; you could send peers unlimited numbers
of invalid alert message to try to either fill up their
debug.log with messages and/or keep their CPU busy
checking signatures.
Fixed by disconnecting/banning peers if they send 10 or more
bad (invalid/expired/cancelled) alerts.
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Conflicts:
src/init.cpp
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Conflicts:
src/main.cpp
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If 950 of the last 1,000 blocks are nVersion=2, reject nVersion=1
(or zero, but no bitcoin release has created block.nVersion=0) blocks
-- 75 of last 100 on testnet3.
This rule is being put in place now so that we don't have to go
through another "express support" process to get what we really
want, which is for every single new block to include the block height
in the coinbase.
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Conflicts:
src/main.cpp
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"Version 2" blocks are blocks that have nVersion=2 and
have the block height as the first item in their coinbase.
Block-height-in-the-coinbase is strictly enforced when
version=2 blocks are a supermajority in the block chain
(750 of the last 1,000 blocks on main net, 51 of 100 for
testnet). This does not affect old clients/miners at all,
which will continue producing nVersion=1 blocks, and
which will continue to be valid.
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Conflicts:
doc/unit-tests.txt
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Conflicts:
src/key.h
src/keystore.h
src/net.h
src/protocol.cpp
src/qt/guiutil.h
src/test/DoS_tests.cpp
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Conflicts:
src/net.cpp
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(PARTIAL: Left out anything changing debug.log)
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Conflicts:
src/init.cpp
src/util.cpp
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interval between subsidy reductions
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Conflicts:
doc/unit-tests.txt
src/serialize.h
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Conflicts:
src/main.cpp
src/serialize.h
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