diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 355 |
1 files changed, 191 insertions, 164 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index fd31c962c..d9b048fd6 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ // Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto -// Copyright (c) 2009-2018 The Bitcoin Core developers +// Copyright (c) 2009-2020 The Bitcoin Core developers // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. @@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ #include <txmempool.h> #include <util/system.h> #include <util/strencodings.h> -#include <util/validation.h> #include <memory> +#include <typeinfo> #if defined(NDEBUG) # error "Bitcoin cannot be compiled without assertions." @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ struct COrphanTx { int64_t nTimeExpire; size_t list_pos; }; -CCriticalSection g_cs_orphans; +RecursiveMutex g_cs_orphans; std::map<uint256, COrphanTx> mapOrphanTransactions GUARDED_BY(g_cs_orphans); void EraseOrphansFor(NodeId peer); @@ -147,6 +147,14 @@ namespace { std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> recentRejects GUARDED_BY(cs_main); uint256 hashRecentRejectsChainTip GUARDED_BY(cs_main); + /* + * Filter for transactions that have been recently confirmed. + * We use this to avoid requesting transactions that have already been + * confirnmed. + */ + RecursiveMutex g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions; + std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> g_recent_confirmed_transactions GUARDED_BY(g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions); + /** Blocks that are in flight, and that are in the queue to be downloaded. */ struct QueuedBlock { uint256 hash; @@ -457,7 +465,7 @@ static bool MarkBlockAsReceived(const uint256& hash) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs // returns false, still setting pit, if the block was already in flight from the same peer // pit will only be valid as long as the same cs_main lock is being held -static bool MarkBlockAsInFlight(NodeId nodeid, const uint256& hash, const CBlockIndex* pindex = nullptr, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator** pit = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { +static bool MarkBlockAsInFlight(CTxMemPool& mempool, NodeId nodeid, const uint256& hash, const CBlockIndex* pindex = nullptr, std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator** pit = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { CNodeState *state = State(nodeid); assert(state != nullptr); @@ -978,42 +986,29 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV } /** - * Returns true if the given validation state result may result in a peer - * banning/disconnecting us. We use this to determine which unaccepted - * transactions from a whitelisted peer that we can safely relay. - */ -static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state) -{ - assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason())); - return state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS; -} - -/** - * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a CValidationState object + * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a BlockValidationState object * - * @param[in] via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing should + * @param[in] via_compact_block this bool is passed in because net_processing should * punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact * block message or not. If the compact block had a valid header, but contained invalid * txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152. * * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected) - * - * Changes here may need to be reflected in TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(). */ -static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") { - switch (state.GetReason()) { - case ValidationInvalidReason::NONE: +static bool MaybePunishNodeForBlock(NodeId nodeid, const BlockValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") { + switch (state.GetResult()) { + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_RESULT_UNSET: break; // The node is providing invalid data: - case ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED: if (!via_compact_block) { LOCK(cs_main); Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); return true; } break; - case ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID: { LOCK(cs_main); CNodeState *node_state = State(nodeid); @@ -1029,30 +1024,24 @@ static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool v } break; } - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV: { LOCK(cs_main); Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); } return true; // Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV: { // TODO: Handle this much more gracefully (10 DoS points is super arbitrary) LOCK(cs_main); Misbehaving(nodeid, 10, message); } return true; - case ValidationInvalidReason::RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE: break; } if (message != "") { @@ -1061,11 +1050,38 @@ static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool v return false; } - - - - - +/** + * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a TxValidationState object + * + * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected) + */ +static bool MaybePunishNodeForTx(NodeId nodeid, const TxValidationState& state, const std::string& message = "") +{ + switch (state.GetResult()) { + case TxValidationResult::TX_RESULT_UNSET: + break; + // The node is providing invalid data: + case TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS: + { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); + return true; + } + // Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy: + case TxValidationResult::TX_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE: + case TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD: + case TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS: + case TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND: + case TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED: + case TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT: + case TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY: + break; + } + if (message != "") { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message); + } + return false; +} ////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// @@ -1086,12 +1102,25 @@ static bool BlockRequestAllowed(const CBlockIndex* pindex, const Consensus::Para (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(*pindexBestHeader, *pindex, *pindexBestHeader, consensusParams) < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT); } -PeerLogicValidation::PeerLogicValidation(CConnman* connmanIn, BanMan* banman, CScheduler& scheduler) - : connman(connmanIn), m_banman(banman), m_stale_tip_check_time(0) +PeerLogicValidation::PeerLogicValidation(CConnman* connmanIn, BanMan* banman, CScheduler& scheduler, CTxMemPool& pool) + : connman(connmanIn), + m_banman(banman), + m_mempool(pool), + m_stale_tip_check_time(0) { // Initialize global variables that cannot be constructed at startup. recentRejects.reset(new CRollingBloomFilter(120000, 0.000001)); + // Blocks don't typically have more than 4000 transactions, so this should + // be at least six blocks (~1 hr) worth of transactions that we can store. + // If the number of transactions appearing in a block goes up, or if we are + // seeing getdata requests more than an hour after initial announcement, we + // can increase this number. + // The false positive rate of 1/1M should come out to less than 1 + // transaction per day that would be inadvertently ignored (which is the + // same probability that we have in the reject filter). + g_recent_confirmed_transactions.reset(new CRollingBloomFilter(24000, 0.000001)); + const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus(); // Stale tip checking and peer eviction are on two different timers, but we // don't want them to get out of sync due to drift in the scheduler, so we @@ -1105,40 +1134,63 @@ PeerLogicValidation::PeerLogicValidation(CConnman* connmanIn, BanMan* banman, CS * Evict orphan txn pool entries (EraseOrphanTx) based on a newly connected * block. Also save the time of the last tip update. */ -void PeerLogicValidation::BlockConnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, const CBlockIndex* pindex, const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& vtxConflicted) { - LOCK(g_cs_orphans); +void PeerLogicValidation::BlockConnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, const CBlockIndex* pindex, const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& vtxConflicted) +{ + { + LOCK(g_cs_orphans); - std::vector<uint256> vOrphanErase; + std::vector<uint256> vOrphanErase; - for (const CTransactionRef& ptx : pblock->vtx) { - const CTransaction& tx = *ptx; + for (const CTransactionRef& ptx : pblock->vtx) { + const CTransaction& tx = *ptx; - // Which orphan pool entries must we evict? - for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) { - auto itByPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(txin.prevout); - if (itByPrev == mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) continue; - for (auto mi = itByPrev->second.begin(); mi != itByPrev->second.end(); ++mi) { - const CTransaction& orphanTx = *(*mi)->second.tx; - const uint256& orphanHash = orphanTx.GetHash(); - vOrphanErase.push_back(orphanHash); + // Which orphan pool entries must we evict? + for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) { + auto itByPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(txin.prevout); + if (itByPrev == mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.end()) continue; + for (auto mi = itByPrev->second.begin(); mi != itByPrev->second.end(); ++mi) { + const CTransaction& orphanTx = *(*mi)->second.tx; + const uint256& orphanHash = orphanTx.GetHash(); + vOrphanErase.push_back(orphanHash); + } } } - } - // Erase orphan transactions included or precluded by this block - if (vOrphanErase.size()) { - int nErased = 0; - for (const uint256& orphanHash : vOrphanErase) { - nErased += EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); + // Erase orphan transactions included or precluded by this block + if (vOrphanErase.size()) { + int nErased = 0; + for (const uint256& orphanHash : vOrphanErase) { + nErased += EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); + } + LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "Erased %d orphan tx included or conflicted by block\n", nErased); + } + + g_last_tip_update = GetTime(); + } + { + LOCK(g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions); + for (const auto& ptx : pblock->vtx) { + g_recent_confirmed_transactions->insert(ptx->GetHash()); } - LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "Erased %d orphan tx included or conflicted by block\n", nErased); } +} - g_last_tip_update = GetTime(); +void PeerLogicValidation::BlockDisconnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &block, const CBlockIndex* pindex) +{ + // To avoid relay problems with transactions that were previously + // confirmed, clear our filter of recently confirmed transactions whenever + // there's a reorg. + // This means that in a 1-block reorg (where 1 block is disconnected and + // then another block reconnected), our filter will drop to having only one + // block's worth of transactions in it, but that should be fine, since + // presumably the most common case of relaying a confirmed transaction + // should be just after a new block containing it is found. + LOCK(g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions); + g_recent_confirmed_transactions->reset(); } // All of the following cache a recent block, and are protected by cs_most_recent_block -static CCriticalSection cs_most_recent_block; +static RecursiveMutex cs_most_recent_block; static std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> most_recent_block GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block); static std::shared_ptr<const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs> most_recent_compact_block GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block); static uint256 most_recent_block_hash GUARDED_BY(cs_most_recent_block); @@ -1229,7 +1281,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew, const CB * Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer banning, maintain which * peers announce compact blocks. */ -void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationState& state) { +void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const BlockValidationState& state) { LOCK(cs_main); const uint256 hash(block.GetHash()); @@ -1240,7 +1292,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationSta if (state.IsInvalid() && it != mapBlockSource.end() && State(it->second.first)) { - MaybePunishNode(/*nodeid=*/ it->second.first, state, /*via_compact_block=*/ !it->second.second); + MaybePunishNodeForBlock(/*nodeid=*/ it->second.first, state, /*via_compact_block=*/ !it->second.second); } // Check that: // 1. The block is valid @@ -1265,7 +1317,7 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationSta // -bool static AlreadyHave(const CInv& inv) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +bool static AlreadyHave(const CInv& inv, const CTxMemPool& mempool) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { switch (inv.type) { @@ -1287,12 +1339,14 @@ bool static AlreadyHave(const CInv& inv) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) LOCK(g_cs_orphans); if (mapOrphanTransactions.count(inv.hash)) return true; } - const CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = ::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip(); + + { + LOCK(g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions); + if (g_recent_confirmed_transactions->contains(inv.hash)) return true; + } return recentRejects->contains(inv.hash) || - mempool.exists(inv.hash) || - coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(inv.hash, 0)) || // Best effort: only try output 0 and 1 - coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(inv.hash, 1)); + mempool.exists(inv.hash); } case MSG_BLOCK: case MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK: @@ -1317,7 +1371,7 @@ static void RelayAddress(const CAddress& addr, bool fReachable, CConnman* connma // Relay to a limited number of other nodes // Use deterministic randomness to send to the same nodes for 24 hours - // at a time so the addrKnowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats + // at a time so the m_addr_knowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats uint64_t hashAddr = addr.GetHash(); const CSipHasher hasher = connman->GetDeterministicRandomizer(RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY).Write(hashAddr << 32).Write((GetTime() + hashAddr) / (24*60*60)); FastRandomContext insecure_rand; @@ -1378,9 +1432,9 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c } } // release cs_main before calling ActivateBestChain if (need_activate_chain) { - CValidationState state; + BlockValidationState state; if (!ActivateBestChain(state, Params(), a_recent_block)) { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", FormatStateMessage(state)); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", state.ToString()); } } @@ -1502,7 +1556,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c } } -void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc) LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main) +void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, const CTxMemPool& mempool, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc) LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main) { AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main); @@ -1615,7 +1669,7 @@ inline void static SendBlockTransactions(const CBlock& block, const BlockTransac connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, resp)); } -bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const CChainParams& chainparams, bool via_compact_block) +bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode* pfrom, CConnman* connman, CTxMemPool& mempool, const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const CChainParams& chainparams, bool via_compact_block) { const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()); size_t nCount = headers.size(); @@ -1674,11 +1728,10 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve } } - CValidationState state; - CBlockHeader first_invalid_header; - if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast, &first_invalid_header)) { + BlockValidationState state; + if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast)) { if (state.IsInvalid()) { - MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, via_compact_block, "invalid header received"); + MaybePunishNodeForBlock(pfrom->GetId(), state, via_compact_block, "invalid header received"); return false; } } @@ -1744,7 +1797,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve } uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags(pfrom); vGetData.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK | nFetchFlags, pindex->GetBlockHash())); - MarkBlockAsInFlight(pfrom->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), pindex); + MarkBlockAsInFlight(mempool, pfrom->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), pindex); LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting block %s from peer=%d\n", pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); } @@ -1798,7 +1851,7 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve return true; } -void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set, std::list<CTransactionRef>& removed_txn) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, g_cs_orphans) +void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, CTxMemPool& mempool, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_set, std::list<CTransactionRef>& removed_txn) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, g_cs_orphans) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(g_cs_orphans); @@ -1814,14 +1867,13 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se const CTransactionRef porphanTx = orphan_it->second.tx; const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx; NodeId fromPeer = orphan_it->second.fromPeer; - bool fMissingInputs2 = false; - // Use a new CValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call - // MaybePunishNode based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer + // Use a new TxValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call + // MaybePunishNodeForTx based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer // that relayed the previous transaction). - CValidationState orphan_state; + TxValidationState orphan_state; if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) continue; - if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, orphan_state, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { + if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, orphan_state, porphanTx, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " accepted orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); RelayTransaction(orphanHash, *connman); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < orphanTx.vout.size(); i++) { @@ -1834,10 +1886,10 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se } EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); done = true; - } else if (!fMissingInputs2) { + } else if (orphan_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) { if (orphan_state.IsInvalid()) { // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx - if (MaybePunishNode(fromPeer, orphan_state, /*via_compact_block*/ false)) { + if (MaybePunishNodeForTx(fromPeer, orphan_state)) { setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer); } LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); @@ -1845,8 +1897,7 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " removed orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); - assert(IsTransactionReason(orphan_state.GetReason())); - if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && orphan_state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { + if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && orphan_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. @@ -1860,7 +1911,7 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se } } -bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int64_t nTimeReceived, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc) +bool ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int64_t nTimeReceived, const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool& mempool, CConnman* connman, BanMan* banman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received: %s (%u bytes) peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(strCommand), vRecv.size(), pfrom->GetId()); if (gArgs.IsArgSet("-dropmessagestest") && GetRand(gArgs.GetArg("-dropmessagestest", 0)) == 0) @@ -2136,7 +2187,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if (addr.nTime <= 100000000 || addr.nTime > nNow + 10 * 60) addr.nTime = nNow - 5 * 24 * 60 * 60; pfrom->AddAddressKnown(addr); - if (g_banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them + if (banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them bool fReachable = IsReachable(addr); if (addr.nTime > nSince && !pfrom->fGetAddr && vAddr.size() <= 10 && addr.IsRoutable()) { @@ -2212,7 +2263,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if (interruptMsgProc) return true; - bool fAlreadyHave = AlreadyHave(inv); + bool fAlreadyHave = AlreadyHave(inv, mempool); LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "got inv: %s %s peer=%d\n", inv.ToString(), fAlreadyHave ? "have" : "new", pfrom->GetId()); if (inv.type == MSG_TX) { @@ -2263,7 +2314,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } pfrom->vRecvGetData.insert(pfrom->vRecvGetData.end(), vInv.begin(), vInv.end()); - ProcessGetData(pfrom, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc); + ProcessGetData(pfrom, chainparams, connman, mempool, interruptMsgProc); return true; } @@ -2291,9 +2342,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr LOCK(cs_most_recent_block); a_recent_block = most_recent_block; } - CValidationState state; + BlockValidationState state; if (!ActivateBestChain(state, Params(), a_recent_block)) { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", FormatStateMessage(state)); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", state.ToString()); } } @@ -2471,8 +2522,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans); - bool fMissingInputs = false; - CValidationState state; + TxValidationState state; CNodeState* nodestate = State(pfrom->GetId()); nodestate->m_tx_download.m_tx_announced.erase(inv.hash); @@ -2481,8 +2531,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr std::list<CTransactionRef> lRemovedTxn; - if (!AlreadyHave(inv) && - AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, ptx, &fMissingInputs, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { + if (!AlreadyHave(inv, mempool) && + AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, ptx, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { mempool.check(&::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip()); RelayTransaction(tx.GetHash(), *connman); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); i++) { @@ -2502,9 +2552,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr mempool.size(), mempool.DynamicMemoryUsage() / 1000); // Recursively process any orphan transactions that depended on this one - ProcessOrphanTx(connman, pfrom->orphan_work_set, lRemovedTxn); + ProcessOrphanTx(connman, mempool, pfrom->orphan_work_set, lRemovedTxn); } - else if (fMissingInputs) + else if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) { bool fRejectedParents = false; // It may be the case that the orphans parents have all been rejected for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) { @@ -2520,7 +2570,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) { CInv _inv(MSG_TX | nFetchFlags, txin.prevout.hash); pfrom->AddInventoryKnown(_inv); - if (!AlreadyHave(_inv)) RequestTx(State(pfrom->GetId()), _inv.hash, current_time); + if (!AlreadyHave(_inv, mempool)) RequestTx(State(pfrom->GetId()), _inv.hash, current_time); } AddOrphanTx(ptx, pfrom->GetId()); @@ -2537,8 +2587,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash()); } } else { - assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason())); - if (!tx.HasWitness() && state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { + if (!tx.HasWitness() && state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. @@ -2553,14 +2602,11 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if (pfrom->HasPermission(PF_FORCERELAY)) { // Always relay transactions received from whitelisted peers, even - // if they were already in the mempool or rejected from it due - // to policy, allowing the node to function as a gateway for + // if they were already in the mempool, + // allowing the node to function as a gateway for // nodes hidden behind it. - // - // Never relay transactions that might result in being - // disconnected (or banned). - if (state.IsInvalid() && TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(state)) { - LogPrintf("Not relaying invalid transaction %s from whitelisted peer=%d (%s)\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), FormatStateMessage(state)); + if (!mempool.exists(tx.GetHash())) { + LogPrintf("Not relaying non-mempool transaction %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); } else { LogPrintf("Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); RelayTransaction(tx.GetHash(), *connman); @@ -2592,8 +2638,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr { LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), - FormatStateMessage(state)); - MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false); + state.ToString()); + MaybePunishNodeForTx(pfrom->GetId(), state); } return true; } @@ -2627,10 +2673,10 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr; - CValidationState state; + BlockValidationState state; if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders({cmpctblock.header}, state, chainparams, &pindex)) { if (state.IsInvalid()) { - MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ true, "invalid header via cmpctblock"); + MaybePunishNodeForBlock(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ true, "invalid header via cmpctblock"); return true; } } @@ -2699,7 +2745,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if ((!fAlreadyInFlight && nodestate->nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER) || (fAlreadyInFlight && blockInFlightIt->second.first == pfrom->GetId())) { std::list<QueuedBlock>::iterator* queuedBlockIt = nullptr; - if (!MarkBlockAsInFlight(pfrom->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), pindex, &queuedBlockIt)) { + if (!MarkBlockAsInFlight(mempool, pfrom->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), pindex, &queuedBlockIt)) { if (!(*queuedBlockIt)->partialBlock) (*queuedBlockIt)->partialBlock.reset(new PartiallyDownloadedBlock(&mempool)); else { @@ -2772,7 +2818,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } // cs_main if (fProcessBLOCKTXN) - return ProcessMessage(pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, blockTxnMsg, nTimeReceived, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc); + return ProcessMessage(pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, blockTxnMsg, nTimeReceived, chainparams, mempool, connman, banman, interruptMsgProc); if (fRevertToHeaderProcessing) { // Headers received from HB compact block peers are permitted to be @@ -2780,7 +2826,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // the peer if the header turns out to be for an invalid block. // Note that if a peer tries to build on an invalid chain, that // will be detected and the peer will be banned. - return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, {cmpctblock.header}, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/true); + return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, mempool, {cmpctblock.header}, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/true); } if (fBlockReconstructed) { @@ -2924,7 +2970,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr ReadCompactSize(vRecv); // ignore tx count; assume it is 0. } - return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, headers, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/false); + return ProcessHeadersMessage(pfrom, connman, mempool, headers, chainparams, /*via_compact_block=*/false); } if (strCommand == NetMsgType::BLOCK) @@ -2990,7 +3036,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr std::vector<CAddress> vAddr = connman->GetAddresses(); FastRandomContext insecure_rand; for (const CAddress &addr : vAddr) { - if (!g_banman->IsBanned(addr)) { + if (!banman->IsBanned(addr)) { pfrom->PushAddress(addr, insecure_rand); } } @@ -3242,12 +3288,12 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter bool fMoreWork = false; if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty()) - ProcessGetData(pfrom, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc); + ProcessGetData(pfrom, chainparams, connman, m_mempool, interruptMsgProc); if (!pfrom->orphan_work_set.empty()) { std::list<CTransactionRef> removed_txn; LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans); - ProcessOrphanTx(connman, pfrom->orphan_work_set, removed_txn); + ProcessOrphanTx(connman, m_mempool, pfrom->orphan_work_set, removed_txn); for (const CTransactionRef& removedTx : removed_txn) { AddToCompactExtraTransactions(removedTx); } @@ -3310,37 +3356,15 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter bool fRet = false; try { - fRet = ProcessMessage(pfrom, strCommand, vRecv, msg.m_time, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc); + fRet = ProcessMessage(pfrom, strCommand, vRecv, msg.m_time, chainparams, m_mempool, connman, m_banman, interruptMsgProc); if (interruptMsgProc) return false; if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty()) fMoreWork = true; - } - catch (const std::ios_base::failure& e) - { - if (strstr(e.what(), "end of data")) { - // Allow exceptions from under-length message on vRecv - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught, normally caused by a message being shorter than its stated length\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what()); - } else if (strstr(e.what(), "size too large")) { - // Allow exceptions from over-long size - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what()); - } else if (strstr(e.what(), "non-canonical ReadCompactSize()")) { - // Allow exceptions from non-canonical encoding - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what()); - } else if (strstr(e.what(), "Superfluous witness record")) { - // Allow exceptions from illegal witness encoding - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what()); - } else if (strstr(e.what(), "Unknown transaction optional data")) { - // Allow exceptions from unknown witness encoding - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what()); - } else { - PrintExceptionContinue(&e, "ProcessMessages()"); - } - } - catch (const std::exception& e) { - PrintExceptionContinue(&e, "ProcessMessages()"); + } catch (const std::exception& e) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' (%s) caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what(), typeid(e).name()); } catch (...) { - PrintExceptionContinue(nullptr, "ProcessMessages()"); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Unknown exception caught\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize); } if (!fRet) { @@ -3557,6 +3581,8 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // Address refresh broadcast int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros(); + auto current_time = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>(); + if (pto->IsAddrRelayPeer() && !::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload() && pto->nNextLocalAddrSend < nNow) { AdvertiseLocal(pto); pto->nNextLocalAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); @@ -3569,11 +3595,12 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) pto->nNextAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); std::vector<CAddress> vAddr; vAddr.reserve(pto->vAddrToSend.size()); + assert(pto->m_addr_known); for (const CAddress& addr : pto->vAddrToSend) { - if (!pto->addrKnown.contains(addr.GetKey())) + if (!pto->m_addr_known->contains(addr.GetKey())) { - pto->addrKnown.insert(addr.GetKey()); + pto->m_addr_known->insert(addr.GetKey()); vAddr.push_back(addr); // receiver rejects addr messages larger than 1000 if (vAddr.size() >= 1000) @@ -3777,13 +3804,13 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) LOCK(pto->m_tx_relay->cs_tx_inventory); // Check whether periodic sends should happen bool fSendTrickle = pto->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN); - if (pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend < nNow) { + if (pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend < current_time) { fSendTrickle = true; if (pto->fInbound) { - pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = connman->PoissonNextSendInbound(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); + pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = std::chrono::microseconds{connman->PoissonNextSendInbound(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL)}; } else { // Use half the delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy concern for them. - pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL >> 1); + pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(current_time, std::chrono::seconds{INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL >> 1}); } } @@ -3795,7 +3822,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // Respond to BIP35 mempool requests if (fSendTrickle && pto->m_tx_relay->fSendMempool) { - auto vtxinfo = mempool.infoAll(); + auto vtxinfo = m_mempool.infoAll(); pto->m_tx_relay->fSendMempool = false; CFeeRate filterrate; { @@ -3841,7 +3868,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) } // Topologically and fee-rate sort the inventory we send for privacy and priority reasons. // A heap is used so that not all items need sorting if only a few are being sent. - CompareInvMempoolOrder compareInvMempoolOrder(&mempool); + CompareInvMempoolOrder compareInvMempoolOrder(&m_mempool); std::make_heap(vInvTx.begin(), vInvTx.end(), compareInvMempoolOrder); // No reason to drain out at many times the network's capacity, // especially since we have many peers and some will draw much shorter delays. @@ -3860,7 +3887,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) continue; } // Not in the mempool anymore? don't bother sending it. - auto txinfo = mempool.info(hash); + auto txinfo = m_mempool.info(hash); if (!txinfo.tx) { continue; } @@ -3898,7 +3925,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); // Detect whether we're stalling - const auto current_time = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>(); + current_time = GetTime<std::chrono::microseconds>(); // nNow is the current system time (GetTimeMicros is not mockable) and // should be replaced by the mockable current_time eventually nNow = GetTimeMicros(); @@ -3972,7 +3999,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) for (const CBlockIndex *pindex : vToDownload) { uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags(pto); vGetData.push_back(CInv(MSG_BLOCK | nFetchFlags, pindex->GetBlockHash())); - MarkBlockAsInFlight(pto->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), pindex); + MarkBlockAsInFlight(m_mempool, pto->GetId(), pindex->GetBlockHash(), pindex); LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting block %s (%d) peer=%d\n", pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindex->nHeight, pto->GetId()); } @@ -4015,7 +4042,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // processing at a later time, see below) tx_process_time.erase(tx_process_time.begin()); CInv inv(MSG_TX | GetFetchFlags(pto), txid); - if (!AlreadyHave(inv)) { + if (!AlreadyHave(inv, m_mempool)) { // If this transaction was last requested more than 1 minute ago, // then request. const auto last_request_time = GetTxRequestTime(inv.hash); @@ -4053,7 +4080,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // We don't want white listed peers to filter txs to us if we have -whitelistforcerelay if (pto->m_tx_relay != nullptr && pto->nVersion >= FEEFILTER_VERSION && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-feefilter", DEFAULT_FEEFILTER) && !pto->HasPermission(PF_FORCERELAY)) { - CAmount currentFilter = mempool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFeePerK(); + CAmount currentFilter = m_mempool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFeePerK(); int64_t timeNow = GetTimeMicros(); if (timeNow > pto->m_tx_relay->nextSendTimeFeeFilter) { static CFeeRate default_feerate(DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE); |