diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/net_processing.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/net_processing.cpp | 652 |
1 files changed, 331 insertions, 321 deletions
diff --git a/src/net_processing.cpp b/src/net_processing.cpp index 5efb4adee..d03817834 100644 --- a/src/net_processing.cpp +++ b/src/net_processing.cpp @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ #include <addrman.h> #include <banman.h> -#include <arith_uint256.h> #include <blockencodings.h> #include <chainparams.h> #include <consensus/validation.h> @@ -39,6 +38,8 @@ static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME = 20 * 60; /** Minimum time between orphan transactions expire time checks in seconds */ static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL = 5 * 60; +/** How long to cache transactions in mapRelay for normal relay */ +static constexpr std::chrono::seconds RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME{15 * 60}; /** Headers download timeout expressed in microseconds * Timeout = base + per_header * (expected number of headers) */ static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 15 * 60 * 1000000; // 15 minutes @@ -117,8 +118,8 @@ namespace { int nSyncStarted GUARDED_BY(cs_main) = 0; /** - * Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject - * messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards. + * Sources of received blocks, saved to be able punish them when processing + * happens afterwards. * Set mapBlockSource[hash].second to false if the node should not be * punished if the block is invalid. */ @@ -193,12 +194,6 @@ namespace { } // namespace namespace { -struct CBlockReject { - unsigned char chRejectCode; - std::string strRejectReason; - uint256 hashBlock; -}; - /** * Maintain validation-specific state about nodes, protected by cs_main, instead * by CNode's own locks. This simplifies asynchronous operation, where @@ -216,8 +211,6 @@ struct CNodeState { bool fShouldBan; //! String name of this peer (debugging/logging purposes). const std::string name; - //! List of asynchronously-determined block rejections to notify this peer about. - std::vector<CBlockReject> rejects; //! The best known block we know this peer has announced. const CBlockIndex *pindexBestKnownBlock; //! The hash of the last unknown block this peer has announced. @@ -262,7 +255,7 @@ struct CNodeState { bool fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion; /** State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT - * Only in effect for outbound, non-manual connections, with + * Only in effect for outbound, non-manual, full-relay connections, with * m_protect == false * Algorithm: if a peer's best known block has less work than our tip, * set a timeout CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT seconds in the future: @@ -408,13 +401,16 @@ static void UpdatePreferredDownload(CNode* node, CNodeState* state) EXCLUSIVE_LO nPreferredDownload -= state->fPreferredDownload; // Whether this node should be marked as a preferred download node. - state->fPreferredDownload = (!node->fInbound || node->fWhitelisted) && !node->fOneShot && !node->fClient; + state->fPreferredDownload = (!node->fInbound || node->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) && !node->fOneShot && !node->fClient; nPreferredDownload += state->fPreferredDownload; } static void PushNodeVersion(CNode *pnode, CConnman* connman, int64_t nTime) { + // Note that pnode->GetLocalServices() is a reflection of the local + // services we were offering when the CNode object was created for this + // peer. ServiceFlags nLocalNodeServices = pnode->GetLocalServices(); uint64_t nonce = pnode->GetLocalNonce(); int nNodeStartingHeight = pnode->GetMyStartingHeight(); @@ -425,7 +421,7 @@ static void PushNodeVersion(CNode *pnode, CConnman* connman, int64_t nTime) CAddress addrMe = CAddress(CService(), nLocalNodeServices); connman->PushMessage(pnode, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::VERSION, PROTOCOL_VERSION, (uint64_t)nLocalNodeServices, nTime, addrYou, addrMe, - nonce, strSubVersion, nNodeStartingHeight, ::g_relay_txes)); + nonce, strSubVersion, nNodeStartingHeight, ::g_relay_txes && pnode->m_tx_relay != nullptr)); if (fLogIPs) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, them=%s, peer=%d\n", PROTOCOL_VERSION, nNodeStartingHeight, addrMe.ToString(), addrYou.ToString(), nodeid); @@ -757,7 +753,7 @@ void UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime(NodeId node, int64_t time_in_seconds) } // Returns true for outbound peers, excluding manual connections, feelers, and -// one-shots +// one-shots. static bool IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(const CNode *node) { return !(node->fInbound || node->m_manual_connection || node->fFeeler || node->fOneShot); @@ -986,14 +982,12 @@ void Misbehaving(NodeId pnode, int howmuch, const std::string& message) EXCLUSIV * banning/disconnecting us. We use this to determine which unaccepted * transactions from a whitelisted peer that we can safely relay. */ -static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state) -{ - assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason())); - return state.GetReason() == ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS; +static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const TxValidationState& state) { + return state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS; } /** - * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a CValidationState object + * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a BlockValidationState object * * @param[in] via_compact_block: this bool is passed in because net_processing should * punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact @@ -1001,23 +995,21 @@ static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(const CValidationState& state) * txs, the peer should not be punished. See BIP 152. * * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected) - * - * Changes here may need to be reflected in TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(). */ -static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") { - switch (state.GetReason()) { - case ValidationInvalidReason::NONE: +static bool MaybePunishNodeForBlock(NodeId nodeid, const BlockValidationState& state, bool via_compact_block, const std::string& message = "") { + switch (state.GetResult()) { + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_RESULT_UNSET: break; // The node is providing invalid data: - case ValidationInvalidReason::CONSENSUS: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MUTATED: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED: if (!via_compact_block) { LOCK(cs_main); Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); return true; } break; - case ValidationInvalidReason::CACHED_INVALID: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID: { LOCK(cs_main); CNodeState *node_state = State(nodeid); @@ -1033,30 +1025,24 @@ static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool v } break; } - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV: { LOCK(cs_main); Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); } return true; // Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV: { // TODO: Handle this much more gracefully (10 DoS points is super arbitrary) LOCK(cs_main); Misbehaving(nodeid, 10, message); } return true; - case ValidationInvalidReason::RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE: - case ValidationInvalidReason::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_NOT_STANDARD: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MISSING_INPUTS: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_CONFLICT: - case ValidationInvalidReason::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE: + case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE: break; } if (message != "") { @@ -1065,6 +1051,39 @@ static bool MaybePunishNode(NodeId nodeid, const CValidationState& state, bool v return false; } +/** + * Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a TxValidationState object + * + * @return Returns true if the peer was punished (probably disconnected) + * + * Changes here may need to be reflected in TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect(). + */ +static bool MaybePunishNodeForTx(NodeId nodeid, const TxValidationState& state, const std::string& message = "") { + switch (state.GetResult()) { + case TxValidationResult::TX_RESULT_UNSET: + break; + // The node is providing invalid data: + case TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS: + { + LOCK(cs_main); + Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message); + return true; + } + // Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy: + case TxValidationResult::TX_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE: + case TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD: + case TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS: + case TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND: + case TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED: + case TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT: + case TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY: + break; + } + if (message != "") { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message); + } + return false; +} @@ -1090,8 +1109,9 @@ static bool BlockRequestAllowed(const CBlockIndex* pindex, const Consensus::Para (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(*pindexBestHeader, *pindex, *pindexBestHeader, consensusParams) < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT); } -PeerLogicValidation::PeerLogicValidation(CConnman* connmanIn, BanMan* banman, CScheduler &scheduler, bool enable_bip61) - : connman(connmanIn), m_banman(banman), m_stale_tip_check_time(0), m_enable_bip61(enable_bip61) { +PeerLogicValidation::PeerLogicValidation(CConnman* connmanIn, BanMan* banman, CScheduler& scheduler) + : connman(connmanIn), m_banman(banman), m_stale_tip_check_time(0) +{ // Initialize global variables that cannot be constructed at startup. recentRejects.reset(new CRollingBloomFilter(120000, 0.000001)); @@ -1232,19 +1252,18 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::UpdatedBlockTip(const CBlockIndex *pindexNew, const CB * Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer banning, maintain which * peers announce compact blocks. */ -void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const CValidationState& state) { +void PeerLogicValidation::BlockChecked(const CBlock& block, const BlockValidationState& state) { LOCK(cs_main); const uint256 hash(block.GetHash()); std::map<uint256, std::pair<NodeId, bool>>::iterator it = mapBlockSource.find(hash); - if (state.IsInvalid()) { - // Don't send reject message with code 0 or an internal reject code. - if (it != mapBlockSource.end() && State(it->second.first) && state.GetRejectCode() > 0 && state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) { - CBlockReject reject = {(unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), hash}; - State(it->second.first)->rejects.push_back(reject); - MaybePunishNode(/*nodeid=*/ it->second.first, state, /*via_compact_block=*/ !it->second.second); - } + // If the block failed validation, we know where it came from and we're still connected + // to that peer, maybe punish. + if (state.IsInvalid() && + it != mapBlockSource.end() && + State(it->second.first)) { + MaybePunishNodeForBlock(/*nodeid=*/ it->second.first, state, /*via_compact_block=*/ !it->second.second); } // Check that: // 1. The block is valid @@ -1291,11 +1310,12 @@ bool static AlreadyHave(const CInv& inv) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) LOCK(g_cs_orphans); if (mapOrphanTransactions.count(inv.hash)) return true; } + const CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = ::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip(); return recentRejects->contains(inv.hash) || mempool.exists(inv.hash) || - pcoinsTip->HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(inv.hash, 0)) || // Best effort: only try output 0 and 1 - pcoinsTip->HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(inv.hash, 1)); + coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(inv.hash, 0)) || // Best effort: only try output 0 and 1 + coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(inv.hash, 1)); } case MSG_BLOCK: case MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK: @@ -1329,7 +1349,7 @@ static void RelayAddress(const CAddress& addr, bool fReachable, CConnman* connma assert(nRelayNodes <= best.size()); auto sortfunc = [&best, &hasher, nRelayNodes](CNode* pnode) { - if (pnode->nVersion >= CADDR_TIME_VERSION) { + if (pnode->nVersion >= CADDR_TIME_VERSION && pnode->IsAddrRelayPeer()) { uint64_t hashKey = CSipHasher(hasher).Write(pnode->GetId()).Finalize(); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nRelayNodes; i++) { if (hashKey > best[i].first) { @@ -1381,7 +1401,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c } } // release cs_main before calling ActivateBestChain if (need_activate_chain) { - CValidationState state; + BlockValidationState state; if (!ActivateBestChain(state, Params(), a_recent_block)) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", FormatStateMessage(state)); } @@ -1398,7 +1418,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()); // disconnect node in case we have reached the outbound limit for serving historical blocks // never disconnect whitelisted nodes - if (send && connman->OutboundTargetReached(true) && ( ((pindexBestHeader != nullptr) && (pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() - pindex->GetBlockTime() > HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE)) || inv.type == MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK) && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) + if (send && connman->OutboundTargetReached(true) && ( ((pindexBestHeader != nullptr) && (pindexBestHeader->GetBlockTime() - pindex->GetBlockTime() > HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE)) || inv.type == MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK) && !pfrom->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "historical block serving limit reached, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); @@ -1407,7 +1427,7 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c send = false; } // Avoid leaking prune-height by never sending blocks below the NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold - if (send && !pfrom->fWhitelisted && ( + if (send && !pfrom->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN) && ( (((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) == NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED) && ((pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_NETWORK) != NODE_NETWORK) && (::ChainActive().Tip()->nHeight - pindex->nHeight > (int)NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS + 2 /* add two blocks buffer extension for possible races */) ) )) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignore block request below NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold from peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); @@ -1448,11 +1468,11 @@ void static ProcessGetBlockData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, c { bool sendMerkleBlock = false; CMerkleBlock merkleBlock; - { - LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); - if (pfrom->pfilter) { + if (pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) { + LOCK(pfrom->m_tx_relay->cs_filter); + if (pfrom->m_tx_relay->pfilter) { sendMerkleBlock = true; - merkleBlock = CMerkleBlock(*pblock, *pfrom->pfilter); + merkleBlock = CMerkleBlock(*pblock, *pfrom->m_tx_relay->pfilter); } } if (sendMerkleBlock) { @@ -1512,7 +1532,16 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnm std::deque<CInv>::iterator it = pfrom->vRecvGetData.begin(); std::vector<CInv> vNotFound; const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker(pfrom->GetSendVersion()); - { + + // Note that if we receive a getdata for a MSG_TX or MSG_WITNESS_TX from a + // block-relay-only outbound peer, we will stop processing further getdata + // messages from this peer (likely resulting in our peer eventually + // disconnecting us). + if (pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) { + // mempool entries added before this time have likely expired from mapRelay + const std::chrono::seconds longlived_mempool_time = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>() - RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME; + const std::chrono::seconds mempool_req = pfrom->m_tx_relay->m_last_mempool_req.load(); + LOCK(cs_main); while (it != pfrom->vRecvGetData.end() && (it->type == MSG_TX || it->type == MSG_WITNESS_TX)) { @@ -1532,11 +1561,15 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnm if (mi != mapRelay.end()) { connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::TX, *mi->second)); push = true; - } else if (pfrom->timeLastMempoolReq) { + } else { auto txinfo = mempool.info(inv.hash); // To protect privacy, do not answer getdata using the mempool when - // that TX couldn't have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request. - if (txinfo.tx && txinfo.nTime <= pfrom->timeLastMempoolReq) { + // that TX couldn't have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request, + // or when it's too recent to have expired from mapRelay. + if (txinfo.tx && ( + (mempool_req.count() && txinfo.m_time <= mempool_req) + || (txinfo.m_time <= longlived_mempool_time))) + { connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(nSendFlags, NetMsgType::TX, *txinfo.tx)); push = true; } @@ -1664,11 +1697,10 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve } } - CValidationState state; - CBlockHeader first_invalid_header; - if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast, &first_invalid_header)) { + BlockValidationState state; + if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders(headers, state, chainparams, &pindexLast)) { if (state.IsInvalid()) { - MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, via_compact_block, "invalid header received"); + MaybePunishNodeForBlock(pfrom->GetId(), state, via_compact_block, "invalid header received"); return false; } } @@ -1772,9 +1804,11 @@ bool static ProcessHeadersMessage(CNode *pfrom, CConnman *connman, const std::ve } } - if (!pfrom->fDisconnect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom) && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr) { - // If this is an outbound peer, check to see if we should protect + if (!pfrom->fDisconnect && IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate(pfrom) && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr && pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) { + // If this is an outbound full-relay peer, check to see if we should protect // it from the bad/lagging chain logic. + // Note that block-relay-only peers are already implicitly protected, so we + // only consider setting m_protect for the full-relay peers. if (g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork >= ::ChainActive().Tip()->nChainWork && !nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction\n", pfrom->GetId()); nodestate->m_chain_sync.m_protect = true; @@ -1802,14 +1836,13 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se const CTransactionRef porphanTx = orphan_it->second.tx; const CTransaction& orphanTx = *porphanTx; NodeId fromPeer = orphan_it->second.fromPeer; - bool fMissingInputs2 = false; - // Use a new CValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call - // MaybePunishNode based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer + // Use a new TxValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call + // MaybePunishNodeForTx based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer // that relayed the previous transaction). - CValidationState orphan_state; + TxValidationState orphan_state; if (setMisbehaving.count(fromPeer)) continue; - if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, orphan_state, porphanTx, &fMissingInputs2, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { + if (AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, orphan_state, porphanTx, &removed_txn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " accepted orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); RelayTransaction(orphanHash, *connman); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < orphanTx.vout.size(); i++) { @@ -1822,10 +1855,10 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se } EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); done = true; - } else if (!fMissingInputs2) { + } else if (orphan_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) { if (orphan_state.IsInvalid()) { // Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx - if (MaybePunishNode(fromPeer, orphan_state, /*via_compact_block*/ false)) { + if (MaybePunishNodeForTx(fromPeer, orphan_state)) { setMisbehaving.insert(fromPeer); } LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " invalid orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); @@ -1833,8 +1866,7 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se // Has inputs but not accepted to mempool // Probably non-standard or insufficient fee LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, " removed orphan tx %s\n", orphanHash.ToString()); - assert(IsTransactionReason(orphan_state.GetReason())); - if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && orphan_state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { + if (!orphanTx.HasWitness() && orphan_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. @@ -1844,11 +1876,11 @@ void static ProcessOrphanTx(CConnman* connman, std::set<uint256>& orphan_work_se EraseOrphanTx(orphanHash); done = true; } - mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get()); + mempool.check(&::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip()); } } -bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int64_t nTimeReceived, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc, bool enable_bip61) +bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv, int64_t nTimeReceived, const CChainParams& chainparams, CConnman* connman, BanMan* banman, const std::atomic<bool>& interruptMsgProc) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received: %s (%u bytes) peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(strCommand), vRecv.size(), pfrom->GetId()); if (gArgs.IsArgSet("-dropmessagestest") && GetRand(gArgs.GetArg("-dropmessagestest", 0)) == 0) @@ -1872,38 +1904,10 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } } - if (strCommand == NetMsgType::REJECT) - { - if (LogAcceptCategory(BCLog::NET)) { - try { - std::string strMsg; unsigned char ccode; std::string strReason; - vRecv >> LIMITED_STRING(strMsg, CMessageHeader::COMMAND_SIZE) >> ccode >> LIMITED_STRING(strReason, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH); - - std::ostringstream ss; - ss << strMsg << " code " << itostr(ccode) << ": " << strReason; - - if (strMsg == NetMsgType::BLOCK || strMsg == NetMsgType::TX) - { - uint256 hash; - vRecv >> hash; - ss << ": hash " << hash.ToString(); - } - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Reject %s\n", SanitizeString(ss.str())); - } catch (const std::ios_base::failure&) { - // Avoid feedback loops by preventing reject messages from triggering a new reject message. - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Unparseable reject message received\n"); - } - } - return true; - } - if (strCommand == NetMsgType::VERSION) { // Each connection can only send one version message if (pfrom->nVersion != 0) { - if (enable_bip61) { - connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_DUPLICATE, std::string("Duplicate version message"))); - } LOCK(cs_main); Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 1); return false; @@ -1931,10 +1935,6 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if (!pfrom->fInbound && !pfrom->fFeeler && !pfrom->m_manual_connection && !HasAllDesirableServiceFlags(nServices)) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d does not offer the expected services (%08x offered, %08x expected); disconnecting\n", pfrom->GetId(), nServices, GetDesirableServiceFlags(nServices)); - if (enable_bip61) { - connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, - strprintf("Expected to offer services %08x", GetDesirableServiceFlags(nServices)))); - } pfrom->fDisconnect = true; return false; } @@ -1942,10 +1942,6 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if (nVersion < MIN_PEER_PROTO_VERSION) { // disconnect from peers older than this proto version LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d using obsolete version %i; disconnecting\n", pfrom->GetId(), nVersion); - if (enable_bip61) { - connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_OBSOLETE, - strprintf("Version must be %d or greater", MIN_PEER_PROTO_VERSION))); - } pfrom->fDisconnect = true; return false; } @@ -1995,9 +1991,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // set nodes not capable of serving the complete blockchain history as "limited nodes" pfrom->m_limited_node = (!(nServices & NODE_NETWORK) && (nServices & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED)); - { - LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); - pfrom->fRelayTxes = fRelay; // set to true after we get the first filter* message + if (pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) { + LOCK(pfrom->m_tx_relay->cs_filter); + pfrom->m_tx_relay->fRelayTxes = fRelay; // set to true after we get the first filter* message } // Change version @@ -2016,7 +2012,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr UpdatePreferredDownload(pfrom, State(pfrom->GetId())); } - if (!pfrom->fInbound) + if (!pfrom->fInbound && pfrom->IsAddrRelayPeer()) { // Advertise our address if (fListen && !::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload()) @@ -2088,9 +2084,10 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // Mark this node as currently connected, so we update its timestamp later. LOCK(cs_main); State(pfrom->GetId())->fCurrentlyConnected = true; - LogPrintf("New outbound peer connected: version: %d, blocks=%d, peer=%d%s\n", - pfrom->nVersion.load(), pfrom->nStartingHeight, pfrom->GetId(), - (fLogIPs ? strprintf(", peeraddr=%s", pfrom->addr.ToString()) : "")); + LogPrintf("New outbound peer connected: version: %d, blocks=%d, peer=%d%s (%s)\n", + pfrom->nVersion.load(), pfrom->nStartingHeight, + pfrom->GetId(), (fLogIPs ? strprintf(", peeraddr=%s", pfrom->addr.ToString()) : ""), + pfrom->m_tx_relay == nullptr ? "block-relay" : "full-relay"); } if (pfrom->nVersion >= SENDHEADERS_VERSION) { @@ -2131,6 +2128,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // Don't want addr from older versions unless seeding if (pfrom->nVersion < CADDR_TIME_VERSION && connman->GetAddressCount() > 1000) return true; + if (!pfrom->IsAddrRelayPeer()) { + return true; + } if (vAddr.size() > 1000) { LOCK(cs_main); @@ -2156,7 +2156,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if (addr.nTime <= 100000000 || addr.nTime > nNow + 10 * 60) addr.nTime = nNow - 5 * 24 * 60 * 60; pfrom->AddAddressKnown(addr); - if (g_banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them + if (banman->IsBanned(addr)) continue; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them bool fReachable = IsReachable(addr); if (addr.nTime > nSince && !pfrom->fGetAddr && vAddr.size() <= 10 && addr.IsRoutable()) { @@ -2214,10 +2214,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr return false; } - bool fBlocksOnly = !g_relay_txes; + // We won't accept tx inv's if we're in blocks-only mode, or this is a + // block-relay-only peer + bool fBlocksOnly = !g_relay_txes || (pfrom->m_tx_relay == nullptr); // Allow whitelisted peers to send data other than blocks in blocks only mode if whitelistrelay is true - if (pfrom->fWhitelisted && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTRELAY)) + if (pfrom->HasPermission(PF_RELAY)) fBlocksOnly = false; LOCK(cs_main); @@ -2253,7 +2255,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr { pfrom->AddInventoryKnown(inv); if (fBlocksOnly) { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "transaction (%s) inv sent in violation of protocol peer=%d\n", inv.hash.ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "transaction (%s) inv sent in violation of protocol, disconnecting peer=%d\n", inv.hash.ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + return true; } else if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload()) { RequestTx(State(pfrom->GetId()), inv.hash, current_time); } @@ -2307,7 +2311,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr LOCK(cs_most_recent_block); a_recent_block = most_recent_block; } - CValidationState state; + BlockValidationState state; if (!ActivateBestChain(state, Params(), a_recent_block)) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", FormatStateMessage(state)); } @@ -2412,7 +2416,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } LOCK(cs_main); - if (::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload() && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) { + if (::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload() && !pfrom->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring getheaders from peer=%d because node is in initial block download\n", pfrom->GetId()); return true; } @@ -2470,9 +2474,11 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr if (strCommand == NetMsgType::TX) { // Stop processing the transaction early if // We are in blocks only mode and peer is either not whitelisted or whitelistrelay is off - if (!g_relay_txes && (!pfrom->fWhitelisted || !gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistrelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTRELAY))) + // or if this peer is supposed to be a block-relay-only peer + if ((!g_relay_txes && !pfrom->HasPermission(PF_RELAY)) || (pfrom->m_tx_relay == nullptr)) { LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "transaction sent in violation of protocol peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; return true; } @@ -2485,8 +2491,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr LOCK2(cs_main, g_cs_orphans); - bool fMissingInputs = false; - CValidationState state; + TxValidationState state; CNodeState* nodestate = State(pfrom->GetId()); nodestate->m_tx_download.m_tx_announced.erase(inv.hash); @@ -2496,8 +2501,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr std::list<CTransactionRef> lRemovedTxn; if (!AlreadyHave(inv) && - AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, ptx, &fMissingInputs, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { - mempool.check(pcoinsTip.get()); + AcceptToMemoryPool(mempool, state, ptx, &lRemovedTxn, false /* bypass_limits */, 0 /* nAbsurdFee */)) { + mempool.check(&::ChainstateActive().CoinsTip()); RelayTransaction(tx.GetHash(), *connman); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); i++) { auto it_by_prev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.find(COutPoint(inv.hash, i)); @@ -2518,7 +2523,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // Recursively process any orphan transactions that depended on this one ProcessOrphanTx(connman, pfrom->orphan_work_set, lRemovedTxn); } - else if (fMissingInputs) + else if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) { bool fRejectedParents = false; // It may be the case that the orphans parents have all been rejected for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) { @@ -2538,7 +2543,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } AddOrphanTx(ptx, pfrom->GetId()); - // DoS prevention: do not allow mapOrphanTransactions to grow unbounded + // DoS prevention: do not allow mapOrphanTransactions to grow unbounded (see CVE-2012-3789) unsigned int nMaxOrphanTx = (unsigned int)std::max((int64_t)0, gArgs.GetArg("-maxorphantx", DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS)); unsigned int nEvicted = LimitOrphanTxSize(nMaxOrphanTx); if (nEvicted > 0) { @@ -2551,8 +2556,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr recentRejects->insert(tx.GetHash()); } } else { - assert(IsTransactionReason(state.GetReason())); - if (!tx.HasWitness() && state.GetReason() != ValidationInvalidReason::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { + if (!tx.HasWitness() && state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED) { // Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or // witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated. // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details. @@ -2565,7 +2569,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr AddToCompactExtraTransactions(ptx); } - if (pfrom->fWhitelisted && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistforcerelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTFORCERELAY)) { + if (pfrom->HasPermission(PF_FORCERELAY)) { // Always relay transactions received from whitelisted peers, even // if they were already in the mempool or rejected from it due // to policy, allowing the node to function as a gateway for @@ -2607,11 +2611,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n", tx.GetHash().ToString(), pfrom->GetId(), FormatStateMessage(state)); - if (enable_bip61 && state.GetRejectCode() > 0 && state.GetRejectCode() < REJECT_INTERNAL) { // Never send AcceptToMemoryPool's internal codes over P2P - connman->PushMessage(pfrom, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, (unsigned char)state.GetRejectCode(), - state.GetRejectReason().substr(0, MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH), inv.hash)); - } - MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ false); + MaybePunishNodeForTx(pfrom->GetId(), state); } return true; } @@ -2645,10 +2645,10 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } const CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr; - CValidationState state; + BlockValidationState state; if (!ProcessNewBlockHeaders({cmpctblock.header}, state, chainparams, &pindex)) { if (state.IsInvalid()) { - MaybePunishNode(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ true, "invalid header via cmpctblock"); + MaybePunishNodeForBlock(pfrom->GetId(), state, /*via_compact_block*/ true, "invalid header via cmpctblock"); return true; } } @@ -2790,7 +2790,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } // cs_main if (fProcessBLOCKTXN) - return ProcessMessage(pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, blockTxnMsg, nTimeReceived, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc, enable_bip61); + return ProcessMessage(pfrom, NetMsgType::BLOCKTXN, blockTxnMsg, nTimeReceived, chainparams, connman, banman, interruptMsgProc); if (fRevertToHeaderProcessing) { // Headers received from HB compact block peers are permitted to be @@ -2888,11 +2888,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // been run). This is handled below, so just treat this as // though the block was successfully read, and rely on the // handling in ProcessNewBlock to ensure the block index is - // updated, reject messages go out, etc. + // updated, etc. MarkBlockAsReceived(resp.blockhash); // it is now an empty pointer fBlockRead = true; - // mapBlockSource is only used for sending reject messages and DoS scores, - // so the race between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine. + // mapBlockSource is used for potentially punishing peers and + // updating which peers send us compact blocks, so the race + // between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine. // BIP 152 permits peers to relay compact blocks after validating // the header only; we should not punish peers if the block turns // out to be invalid. @@ -2964,8 +2965,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr // Also always process if we requested the block explicitly, as we may // need it even though it is not a candidate for a new best tip. forceProcessing |= MarkBlockAsReceived(hash); - // mapBlockSource is only used for sending reject messages and DoS scores, - // so the race between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine. + // mapBlockSource is only used for punishing peers and setting + // which peers send us compact blocks, so the race between here and + // cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine. mapBlockSource.emplace(hash, std::make_pair(pfrom->GetId(), true)); } bool fNewBlock = false; @@ -2989,6 +2991,10 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring \"getaddr\" from outbound connection. peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); return true; } + if (!pfrom->IsAddrRelayPeer()) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring \"getaddr\" from block-relay-only connection. peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + return true; + } // Only send one GetAddr response per connection to reduce resource waste // and discourage addr stamping of INV announcements. @@ -3002,7 +3008,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr std::vector<CAddress> vAddr = connman->GetAddresses(); FastRandomContext insecure_rand; for (const CAddress &addr : vAddr) { - if (!g_banman->IsBanned(addr)) { + if (!banman->IsBanned(addr)) { pfrom->PushAddress(addr, insecure_rand); } } @@ -3010,22 +3016,30 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } if (strCommand == NetMsgType::MEMPOOL) { - if (!(pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_BLOOM) && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) + if (!(pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_BLOOM) && !pfrom->HasPermission(PF_MEMPOOL)) { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "mempool request with bloom filters disabled, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); - pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + if (!pfrom->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "mempool request with bloom filters disabled, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + } return true; } - if (connman->OutboundTargetReached(false) && !pfrom->fWhitelisted) + if (connman->OutboundTargetReached(false) && !pfrom->HasPermission(PF_MEMPOOL)) { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "mempool request with bandwidth limit reached, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); - pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + if (!pfrom->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) + { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "mempool request with bandwidth limit reached, disconnect peer=%d\n", pfrom->GetId()); + pfrom->fDisconnect = true; + } return true; } - LOCK(pfrom->cs_inventory); - pfrom->fSendMempool = true; + if (pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) { + LOCK(pfrom->m_tx_relay->cs_tx_inventory); + pfrom->m_tx_relay->fSendMempool = true; + } return true; } @@ -3116,12 +3130,12 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr LOCK(cs_main); Misbehaving(pfrom->GetId(), 100); } - else + else if (pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) { - LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); - pfrom->pfilter.reset(new CBloomFilter(filter)); - pfrom->pfilter->UpdateEmptyFull(); - pfrom->fRelayTxes = true; + LOCK(pfrom->m_tx_relay->cs_filter); + pfrom->m_tx_relay->pfilter.reset(new CBloomFilter(filter)); + pfrom->m_tx_relay->pfilter->UpdateEmptyFull(); + pfrom->m_tx_relay->fRelayTxes = true; } return true; } @@ -3135,10 +3149,10 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr bool bad = false; if (vData.size() > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE) { bad = true; - } else { - LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); - if (pfrom->pfilter) { - pfrom->pfilter->insert(vData); + } else if (pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) { + LOCK(pfrom->m_tx_relay->cs_filter); + if (pfrom->m_tx_relay->pfilter) { + pfrom->m_tx_relay->pfilter->insert(vData); } else { bad = true; } @@ -3151,11 +3165,14 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr } if (strCommand == NetMsgType::FILTERCLEAR) { - LOCK(pfrom->cs_filter); + if (pfrom->m_tx_relay == nullptr) { + return true; + } + LOCK(pfrom->m_tx_relay->cs_filter); if (pfrom->GetLocalServices() & NODE_BLOOM) { - pfrom->pfilter.reset(new CBloomFilter()); + pfrom->m_tx_relay->pfilter.reset(new CBloomFilter()); } - pfrom->fRelayTxes = true; + pfrom->m_tx_relay->fRelayTxes = true; return true; } @@ -3163,9 +3180,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr CAmount newFeeFilter = 0; vRecv >> newFeeFilter; if (MoneyRange(newFeeFilter)) { - { - LOCK(pfrom->cs_feeFilter); - pfrom->minFeeFilter = newFeeFilter; + if (pfrom->m_tx_relay != nullptr) { + LOCK(pfrom->m_tx_relay->cs_feeFilter); + pfrom->m_tx_relay->minFeeFilter = newFeeFilter; } LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received: feefilter of %s from peer=%d\n", CFeeRate(newFeeFilter).ToString(), pfrom->GetId()); } @@ -3202,21 +3219,14 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, const std::string& strCommand, CDataStr return true; } -bool PeerLogicValidation::SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned(CNode* pnode, bool enable_bip61) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) +bool PeerLogicValidation::CheckIfBanned(CNode* pnode) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); CNodeState &state = *State(pnode->GetId()); - if (enable_bip61) { - for (const CBlockReject& reject : state.rejects) { - connman->PushMessage(pnode, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, std::string(NetMsgType::BLOCK), reject.chRejectCode, reject.strRejectReason, reject.hashBlock)); - } - } - state.rejects.clear(); - if (state.fShouldBan) { state.fShouldBan = false; - if (pnode->fWhitelisted) + if (pnode->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing whitelisted peer %s!\n", pnode->addr.ToString()); else if (pnode->m_manual_connection) LogPrintf("Warning: not punishing manually-connected peer %s!\n", pnode->addr.ToString()); @@ -3280,41 +3290,37 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter return false; // Just take one message msgs.splice(msgs.begin(), pfrom->vProcessMsg, pfrom->vProcessMsg.begin()); - pfrom->nProcessQueueSize -= msgs.front().vRecv.size() + CMessageHeader::HEADER_SIZE; + pfrom->nProcessQueueSize -= msgs.front().m_raw_message_size; pfrom->fPauseRecv = pfrom->nProcessQueueSize > connman->GetReceiveFloodSize(); fMoreWork = !pfrom->vProcessMsg.empty(); } CNetMessage& msg(msgs.front()); msg.SetVersion(pfrom->GetRecvVersion()); - // Scan for message start - if (memcmp(msg.hdr.pchMessageStart, chainparams.MessageStart(), CMessageHeader::MESSAGE_START_SIZE) != 0) { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: INVALID MESSAGESTART %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(msg.hdr.GetCommand()), pfrom->GetId()); + // Check network magic + if (!msg.m_valid_netmagic) { + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: INVALID MESSAGESTART %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(msg.m_command), pfrom->GetId()); pfrom->fDisconnect = true; return false; } - // Read header - CMessageHeader& hdr = msg.hdr; - if (!hdr.IsValid(chainparams.MessageStart())) + // Check header + if (!msg.m_valid_header) { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: ERRORS IN HEADER %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(hdr.GetCommand()), pfrom->GetId()); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "PROCESSMESSAGE: ERRORS IN HEADER %s peer=%d\n", SanitizeString(msg.m_command), pfrom->GetId()); return fMoreWork; } - std::string strCommand = hdr.GetCommand(); + const std::string& strCommand = msg.m_command; // Message size - unsigned int nMessageSize = hdr.nMessageSize; + unsigned int nMessageSize = msg.m_message_size; // Checksum - CDataStream& vRecv = msg.vRecv; - const uint256& hash = msg.GetMessageHash(); - if (memcmp(hash.begin(), hdr.pchChecksum, CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE) != 0) + CDataStream& vRecv = msg.m_recv; + if (!msg.m_valid_checksum) { - LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): CHECKSUM ERROR expected %s was %s\n", __func__, - SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, - HexStr(hash.begin(), hash.begin()+CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE), - HexStr(hdr.pchChecksum, hdr.pchChecksum+CMessageHeader::CHECKSUM_SIZE)); + LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): CHECKSUM ERROR peer=%d\n", __func__, + SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, pfrom->GetId()); return fMoreWork; } @@ -3322,7 +3328,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter bool fRet = false; try { - fRet = ProcessMessage(pfrom, strCommand, vRecv, msg.nTime, chainparams, connman, interruptMsgProc, m_enable_bip61); + fRet = ProcessMessage(pfrom, strCommand, vRecv, msg.m_time, chainparams, connman, m_banman, interruptMsgProc); if (interruptMsgProc) return false; if (!pfrom->vRecvGetData.empty()) @@ -3330,9 +3336,6 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter } catch (const std::ios_base::failure& e) { - if (m_enable_bip61) { - connman->PushMessage(pfrom, CNetMsgMaker(INIT_PROTO_VERSION).Make(NetMsgType::REJECT, strCommand, REJECT_MALFORMED, std::string("error parsing message"))); - } if (strstr(e.what(), "end of data")) { // Allow exceptions from under-length message on vRecv LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "%s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught, normally caused by a message being shorter than its stated length\n", __func__, SanitizeString(strCommand), nMessageSize, e.what()); @@ -3363,7 +3366,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::ProcessMessages(CNode* pfrom, std::atomic<bool>& inter } LOCK(cs_main); - SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned(pfrom, m_enable_bip61); + CheckIfBanned(pfrom); return fMoreWork; } @@ -3442,6 +3445,8 @@ void PeerLogicValidation::EvictExtraOutboundPeers(int64_t time_in_seconds) if (state == nullptr) return; // shouldn't be possible, but just in case // Don't evict our protected peers if (state->m_chain_sync.m_protect) return; + // Don't evict our block-relay-only peers. + if (pnode->m_tx_relay == nullptr) return; if (state->m_last_block_announcement < oldest_block_announcement || (state->m_last_block_announcement == oldest_block_announcement && pnode->GetId() > worst_peer)) { worst_peer = pnode->GetId(); oldest_block_announcement = state->m_last_block_announcement; @@ -3560,16 +3565,17 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) } } - TRY_LOCK(cs_main, lockMain); // Acquire cs_main for IsInitialBlockDownload() and CNodeState() + TRY_LOCK(cs_main, lockMain); if (!lockMain) return true; - if (SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned(pto, m_enable_bip61)) return true; + if (CheckIfBanned(pto)) return true; + CNodeState &state = *State(pto->GetId()); // Address refresh broadcast int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros(); - if (!::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload() && pto->nNextLocalAddrSend < nNow) { + if (pto->IsAddrRelayPeer() && !::ChainstateActive().IsInitialBlockDownload() && pto->nNextLocalAddrSend < nNow) { AdvertiseLocal(pto); pto->nNextLocalAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); } @@ -3577,7 +3583,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // // Message: addr // - if (pto->nNextAddrSend < nNow) { + if (pto->IsAddrRelayPeer() && pto->nNextAddrSend < nNow) { pto->nNextAddrSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); std::vector<CAddress> vAddr; vAddr.reserve(pto->vAddrToSend.size()); @@ -3785,120 +3791,124 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) } pto->vInventoryBlockToSend.clear(); - // Check whether periodic sends should happen - bool fSendTrickle = pto->fWhitelisted; - if (pto->nNextInvSend < nNow) { - fSendTrickle = true; - if (pto->fInbound) { - pto->nNextInvSend = connman->PoissonNextSendInbound(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); - } else { - // Use half the delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy concern for them. - pto->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL >> 1); + if (pto->m_tx_relay != nullptr) { + LOCK(pto->m_tx_relay->cs_tx_inventory); + // Check whether periodic sends should happen + bool fSendTrickle = pto->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN); + if (pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend < nNow) { + fSendTrickle = true; + if (pto->fInbound) { + pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = connman->PoissonNextSendInbound(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); + } else { + // Use half the delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy concern for them. + pto->m_tx_relay->nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend(nNow, INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL >> 1); + } } - } - - // Time to send but the peer has requested we not relay transactions. - if (fSendTrickle) { - LOCK(pto->cs_filter); - if (!pto->fRelayTxes) pto->setInventoryTxToSend.clear(); - } - // Respond to BIP35 mempool requests - if (fSendTrickle && pto->fSendMempool) { - auto vtxinfo = mempool.infoAll(); - pto->fSendMempool = false; - CAmount filterrate = 0; - { - LOCK(pto->cs_feeFilter); - filterrate = pto->minFeeFilter; + // Time to send but the peer has requested we not relay transactions. + if (fSendTrickle) { + LOCK(pto->m_tx_relay->cs_filter); + if (!pto->m_tx_relay->fRelayTxes) pto->m_tx_relay->setInventoryTxToSend.clear(); } - LOCK(pto->cs_filter); + // Respond to BIP35 mempool requests + if (fSendTrickle && pto->m_tx_relay->fSendMempool) { + auto vtxinfo = mempool.infoAll(); + pto->m_tx_relay->fSendMempool = false; + CFeeRate filterrate; + { + LOCK(pto->m_tx_relay->cs_feeFilter); + filterrate = CFeeRate(pto->m_tx_relay->minFeeFilter); + } - for (const auto& txinfo : vtxinfo) { - const uint256& hash = txinfo.tx->GetHash(); - CInv inv(MSG_TX, hash); - pto->setInventoryTxToSend.erase(hash); - if (filterrate) { - if (txinfo.feeRate.GetFeePerK() < filterrate) + LOCK(pto->m_tx_relay->cs_filter); + + for (const auto& txinfo : vtxinfo) { + const uint256& hash = txinfo.tx->GetHash(); + CInv inv(MSG_TX, hash); + pto->m_tx_relay->setInventoryTxToSend.erase(hash); + // Don't send transactions that peers will not put into their mempool + if (txinfo.fee < filterrate.GetFee(txinfo.vsize)) { continue; + } + if (pto->m_tx_relay->pfilter) { + if (!pto->m_tx_relay->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(*txinfo.tx)) continue; + } + pto->m_tx_relay->filterInventoryKnown.insert(hash); + vInv.push_back(inv); + if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); + vInv.clear(); + } } - if (pto->pfilter) { - if (!pto->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(*txinfo.tx)) continue; - } - pto->filterInventoryKnown.insert(hash); - vInv.push_back(inv); - if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { - connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); - vInv.clear(); - } + pto->m_tx_relay->m_last_mempool_req = GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>(); } - pto->timeLastMempoolReq = GetTime(); - } - // Determine transactions to relay - if (fSendTrickle) { - // Produce a vector with all candidates for sending - std::vector<std::set<uint256>::iterator> vInvTx; - vInvTx.reserve(pto->setInventoryTxToSend.size()); - for (std::set<uint256>::iterator it = pto->setInventoryTxToSend.begin(); it != pto->setInventoryTxToSend.end(); it++) { - vInvTx.push_back(it); - } - CAmount filterrate = 0; - { - LOCK(pto->cs_feeFilter); - filterrate = pto->minFeeFilter; - } - // Topologically and fee-rate sort the inventory we send for privacy and priority reasons. - // A heap is used so that not all items need sorting if only a few are being sent. - CompareInvMempoolOrder compareInvMempoolOrder(&mempool); - std::make_heap(vInvTx.begin(), vInvTx.end(), compareInvMempoolOrder); - // No reason to drain out at many times the network's capacity, - // especially since we have many peers and some will draw much shorter delays. - unsigned int nRelayedTransactions = 0; - LOCK(pto->cs_filter); - while (!vInvTx.empty() && nRelayedTransactions < INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX) { - // Fetch the top element from the heap - std::pop_heap(vInvTx.begin(), vInvTx.end(), compareInvMempoolOrder); - std::set<uint256>::iterator it = vInvTx.back(); - vInvTx.pop_back(); - uint256 hash = *it; - // Remove it from the to-be-sent set - pto->setInventoryTxToSend.erase(it); - // Check if not in the filter already - if (pto->filterInventoryKnown.contains(hash)) { - continue; + // Determine transactions to relay + if (fSendTrickle) { + // Produce a vector with all candidates for sending + std::vector<std::set<uint256>::iterator> vInvTx; + vInvTx.reserve(pto->m_tx_relay->setInventoryTxToSend.size()); + for (std::set<uint256>::iterator it = pto->m_tx_relay->setInventoryTxToSend.begin(); it != pto->m_tx_relay->setInventoryTxToSend.end(); it++) { + vInvTx.push_back(it); } - // Not in the mempool anymore? don't bother sending it. - auto txinfo = mempool.info(hash); - if (!txinfo.tx) { - continue; - } - if (filterrate && txinfo.feeRate.GetFeePerK() < filterrate) { - continue; - } - if (pto->pfilter && !pto->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(*txinfo.tx)) continue; - // Send - vInv.push_back(CInv(MSG_TX, hash)); - nRelayedTransactions++; + CFeeRate filterrate; { - // Expire old relay messages - while (!vRelayExpiration.empty() && vRelayExpiration.front().first < nNow) - { - mapRelay.erase(vRelayExpiration.front().second); - vRelayExpiration.pop_front(); + LOCK(pto->m_tx_relay->cs_feeFilter); + filterrate = CFeeRate(pto->m_tx_relay->minFeeFilter); + } + // Topologically and fee-rate sort the inventory we send for privacy and priority reasons. + // A heap is used so that not all items need sorting if only a few are being sent. + CompareInvMempoolOrder compareInvMempoolOrder(&mempool); + std::make_heap(vInvTx.begin(), vInvTx.end(), compareInvMempoolOrder); + // No reason to drain out at many times the network's capacity, + // especially since we have many peers and some will draw much shorter delays. + unsigned int nRelayedTransactions = 0; + LOCK(pto->m_tx_relay->cs_filter); + while (!vInvTx.empty() && nRelayedTransactions < INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX) { + // Fetch the top element from the heap + std::pop_heap(vInvTx.begin(), vInvTx.end(), compareInvMempoolOrder); + std::set<uint256>::iterator it = vInvTx.back(); + vInvTx.pop_back(); + uint256 hash = *it; + // Remove it from the to-be-sent set + pto->m_tx_relay->setInventoryTxToSend.erase(it); + // Check if not in the filter already + if (pto->m_tx_relay->filterInventoryKnown.contains(hash)) { + continue; } + // Not in the mempool anymore? don't bother sending it. + auto txinfo = mempool.info(hash); + if (!txinfo.tx) { + continue; + } + // Peer told you to not send transactions at that feerate? Don't bother sending it. + if (txinfo.fee < filterrate.GetFee(txinfo.vsize)) { + continue; + } + if (pto->m_tx_relay->pfilter && !pto->m_tx_relay->pfilter->IsRelevantAndUpdate(*txinfo.tx)) continue; + // Send + vInv.push_back(CInv(MSG_TX, hash)); + nRelayedTransactions++; + { + // Expire old relay messages + while (!vRelayExpiration.empty() && vRelayExpiration.front().first < nNow) + { + mapRelay.erase(vRelayExpiration.front().second); + vRelayExpiration.pop_front(); + } - auto ret = mapRelay.insert(std::make_pair(hash, std::move(txinfo.tx))); - if (ret.second) { - vRelayExpiration.push_back(std::make_pair(nNow + 15 * 60 * 1000000, ret.first)); + auto ret = mapRelay.insert(std::make_pair(hash, std::move(txinfo.tx))); + if (ret.second) { + vRelayExpiration.push_back(std::make_pair(nNow + std::chrono::microseconds{RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME}.count(), ret.first)); + } } + if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { + connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); + vInv.clear(); + } + pto->m_tx_relay->filterInventoryKnown.insert(hash); } - if (vInv.size() == MAX_INV_SZ) { - connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::INV, vInv)); - vInv.clear(); - } - pto->filterInventoryKnown.insert(hash); } } } @@ -3942,7 +3952,7 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // Note: If all our peers are inbound, then we won't // disconnect our sync peer for stalling; we have bigger // problems if we can't get any outbound peers. - if (!pto->fWhitelisted) { + if (!pto->HasPermission(PF_NOBAN)) { LogPrintf("Timeout downloading headers from peer=%d, disconnecting\n", pto->GetId()); pto->fDisconnect = true; return true; @@ -4059,27 +4069,27 @@ bool PeerLogicValidation::SendMessages(CNode* pto) // Message: feefilter // // We don't want white listed peers to filter txs to us if we have -whitelistforcerelay - if (pto->nVersion >= FEEFILTER_VERSION && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-feefilter", DEFAULT_FEEFILTER) && - !(pto->fWhitelisted && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-whitelistforcerelay", DEFAULT_WHITELISTFORCERELAY))) { + if (pto->m_tx_relay != nullptr && pto->nVersion >= FEEFILTER_VERSION && gArgs.GetBoolArg("-feefilter", DEFAULT_FEEFILTER) && + !pto->HasPermission(PF_FORCERELAY)) { CAmount currentFilter = mempool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFeePerK(); int64_t timeNow = GetTimeMicros(); - if (timeNow > pto->nextSendTimeFeeFilter) { + if (timeNow > pto->m_tx_relay->nextSendTimeFeeFilter) { static CFeeRate default_feerate(DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE); static FeeFilterRounder filterRounder(default_feerate); CAmount filterToSend = filterRounder.round(currentFilter); // We always have a fee filter of at least minRelayTxFee filterToSend = std::max(filterToSend, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFeePerK()); - if (filterToSend != pto->lastSentFeeFilter) { + if (filterToSend != pto->m_tx_relay->lastSentFeeFilter) { connman->PushMessage(pto, msgMaker.Make(NetMsgType::FEEFILTER, filterToSend)); - pto->lastSentFeeFilter = filterToSend; + pto->m_tx_relay->lastSentFeeFilter = filterToSend; } - pto->nextSendTimeFeeFilter = PoissonNextSend(timeNow, AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); + pto->m_tx_relay->nextSendTimeFeeFilter = PoissonNextSend(timeNow, AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL); } // If the fee filter has changed substantially and it's still more than MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY // until scheduled broadcast, then move the broadcast to within MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY. - else if (timeNow + MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY * 1000000 < pto->nextSendTimeFeeFilter && - (currentFilter < 3 * pto->lastSentFeeFilter / 4 || currentFilter > 4 * pto->lastSentFeeFilter / 3)) { - pto->nextSendTimeFeeFilter = timeNow + GetRandInt(MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY) * 1000000; + else if (timeNow + MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY * 1000000 < pto->m_tx_relay->nextSendTimeFeeFilter && + (currentFilter < 3 * pto->m_tx_relay->lastSentFeeFilter / 4 || currentFilter > 4 * pto->m_tx_relay->lastSentFeeFilter / 3)) { + pto->m_tx_relay->nextSendTimeFeeFilter = timeNow + GetRandInt(MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY) * 1000000; } } } |