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| author | Peter Todd <[email protected]> | 2017-03-01 10:58:14 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Matt Corallo <[email protected]> | 2017-03-04 09:41:16 -0500 |
| commit | eddc77a1b1a59df4c7ba1a0705d684529b2205a1 (patch) | |
| tree | 5daf250a6afba939c4007f87319cd305f72ea0cf | |
| parent | Verify Tree-SHA512s in merge commits, enforce sigs are not SHA1 (diff) | |
| download | discoin-eddc77a1b1a59df4c7ba1a0705d684529b2205a1.tar.xz discoin-eddc77a1b1a59df4c7ba1a0705d684529b2205a1.zip | |
Add comment re: why SHA1 is disabled
| -rwxr-xr-x | contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh | 9 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh index 4df8bee3b..61e755286 100755 --- a/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh +++ b/contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh @@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ IFS=' if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)" else + # Note how we've disabled SHA1 with the --weak-digest option, disabling + # signatures - including selfsigs - that use SHA1. While you might think that + # collision attacks shouldn't be an issue as they'd be an attack on yourself, + # in fact because what's being signed is a commit object that's + # semi-deterministically generated by untrusted input (the pull-req) in theory + # an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that + # they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing + # it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure. + GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)" fi for LINE in $(echo "$GPG_RES"); do |